The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial Instability by Crotty, James
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2009
The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm:
How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy
Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial
Instability
James Crotty
University of Massachusetts - Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Crotty, James, "The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value
and Create Systemic Financial Instability" (2009). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 2.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/2
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm:  
How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy 
Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial 
Instability  
 
by 
 
James Crotty 
 
Working Paper 2009-13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
  
 
 
 
 
The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: 
How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create 
Systemic Financial Instability 
 
 
 
 
 
Second Draft 
 
 
 
James Crotty 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
October 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I am grateful to Iren Levina and especially Jerry Epstein and Rob Parenteau for helpful 
comments, to Iren Levina for outstanding research assistance, and to the Economics 
Department’s Sheridan Scholars program for research support. 
 1
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We recently experienced a global financial crisis so severe that only massive rescue 
operations by governments around the world prevented a total financial market meltdown 
and perhaps another global Great Depression. One necessary precondition for the crisis 
was the perverse, bonus-driven compensation structure employed in important financial 
institutions such as investment banks. This structure provided the rational incentive for 
key decision makers in these firms (who I call “rainmakers”) to take the excessive risk 
and employ the excessive leverage in the bubble that created the preconditions for the 
crisis. This paper presents and evaluates extensive data on compensation practices in 
investment banks and other important financial institutions. These data show that 
rainmaker compensation has been rising rapidly, is very large, and has asymmetric 
properties that induce reckless risk-taking. Since boom-period bonuses do not have to be 
returned if rainmaker decisions eventually lead to losses for their firms, and since large 
bonuses continue to be paid even when firms in fact suffer large losses, it is rational for 
rainmakers to use unsustainable leverage to invest in recklessly risky assets in the bubble. 
A review of the modest literature on financial firm compensation practices in general and 
those of investment banks in particular demonstrates that the giant bonuses of the recent 
past are not efficient returns to human capital – they are unjustified rents. The paper 
discusses possible answers to the challenging questions: what is the source of rainmaker 
rents and how are they sustained over time? Answers to these questions can help guide 
debates over the appropriate regulation of financial markets. They are also necessary 
inputs to the development of an adequate theory of the “rainmaker” financial firm that 
can help us understand how these firms were able to maximize the compensation of their 
key employees through policies that destroyed shareholder value and created systemic 
financial fragility. To my knowledge, no such theory currently exists. 
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 It is now universally agreed that the US and global economies have experienced 
their worst financial crisis since the 1930s, one that contributed to a severe global 
downturn. This financial crisis has led to massive government bailouts around the world. 
There is debate about the respective roles of the real and financial sectors in the creation 
of this crisis, but it is undeniable that financial markets were at least a major contributor 
to the crash. From a US-centric perspective, it is clear that the evolution of financial 
markets since the end of the 1970s led almost inevitably to a crisis moment such as this.  
In response to economic problems and political pressure in the 1970s and very early 
1980s, the US government began to accelerate an ongoing process of financial market 
deregulation. A combination of deregulation and fast-paced financial innovation led to a 
series of financial crises both in the US and elsewhere. These crises were met by 
government bailouts, which restored vitality to financial markets, but also created severe 
moral hazard – an increasingly assured belief among leaders of financial institutions that 
the government would always intervene to limit the depth and duration of any financial 
downturn. Thus, it was safe for them to take increasing risk and use increasing leverage 
to enlarge financial market profits and maximize the compensation of their key people – 
hereafter known as “rainmakers” – during periods of financial market booms. As a result, 
crises became more threatening, bailouts bigger, and subsequent financial booms more 
vigorous. The term rainmaker is usually taken to mean those who can generate high sales 
for the firm. I use it here to denote all key people in financial firms who are responsible 
for generating high revenue and profit. It thus includes top executives, traders and sales 
people as well as M&A and IPO teams.  
 More important, these cycles were imbedded in a long term trend in which 
financial markets grew ever larger relative to the real economy, and global financial 
markets became increasingly integrated. Financial profits as a share of total corporate 
profits, which was about 10% in the early 1980s reached 40% in the mid 2000s. In 1981, 
US private debt was 123 per cent of gross domestic product; by the third quarter of 2008, 
it was 290 per cent. In 1981, household debt was 48 per cent of GDP; in 2007, it was 100 
per cent. It is important to note that the biggest rise in indebtedness took place in the 
financial sector itself.  
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 The gross debt of the financial sector rose from 22 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 
117 per cent in the third quarter of 2008. This rapid rise in financial firm borrowing 
fueled the financial boom. Borrowed funds were used to bid up asset prices, creating 
higher collateral values that in turn enlarged the borrowing capacity of speculators. 
According to the Fed’s flow of funds data, the liabilities of the investment banking sector 
rose from $548 billion in 1995 to $3 trillion in 2007, an annual growth rate of 16%. 
Between 2002 and 2007, liabilities grew by 138%. (In the midst of the crisis in the first 
quarter of 2009, liabilities fell to $1.8 trillion.) Fast growth in borrowing led to increased 
leverage ratios and thus greater bank risk. Rising leverage also provided the source of 
funding for the spectacular increase in the compensation of top bank employees much 
discussed in the recent past.  
 The rising relative size of financial markets created structural systemic financial 
fragility in which the financial claims on real-sector cash flows became ever larger 
relative to the cash flows themselves. Financial claims also became more complex. 
Mortgages were rolled into mortgage backed securities, which were sliced and diced into 
collateralized debt obligations. Credit default swaps were then written on collateralized 
debt obligation tranches. The extreme complexity of structured financial products made 
them non-transparent or opaque, which made it easy for markets to substantially 
underestimate their risk in the bubble. Before 2008 it was not clear when this process 
would end, or what the end game would look like. But it was clear, at least to some, that 
the entire process had become unsustainable. (See for example Crotty 2007 or Noriel 
Roubini’s website). By the fall of 2008 it was apparent to everyone that the global 
financial system was on the verge of collapse.   
As this paper will show, rainmakers received huge bonuses by taking excessive 
risk and using dangerous levels of leverage and did not have to return these bonuses 
when their risk-seeking caused their firms and the entire financial system to crash. 
Indeed, they continued to receive exorbitant bonuses even in the downturn. The 
asymmetry in rainmaker compensation schemes combined with deregulation and 
destructive financial innovation made the outbreak of a serious crisis almost inevitable. 
(For an analysis of the financial causes of the recent crisis, see Crotty 2009.)  
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Financial institutions infected by perverse incentives include independent 
investment banks, large commercial-bank centered financial conglomerates (that include 
in-house investment banks, hedge and private equity funds), hedge funds, private equity 
funds, institutional investors such as mutual funds, general and monoline insurance 
companies and ratings agencies. Perverse compensation incentives led ratings agencies to 
hide the buildup of excessive risk throughout the system by giving safe ratings to 
extremely dangerous financial products.1 
Among the financial institutions with perverse incentives, investment banks – 
whether independent or part of financial conglomerates - played a crucial role in creating 
recent boom-bust cycles and the secular expansion of financial markets in our era. They 
were the source of most of the financial innovations - such as mortgage backed securities, 
collaterized debt obligations of various kinds and credit default swaps - that helped create 
the crisis. Investment banks were also at the center of the leverage creation process. Half 
of the spectacular rise in investment bank’s return on equity in the four years leading up 
to the crisis was generated by higher leverage rather than smart investing, efficient 
innovation or even boom-induced capital gains on trading assets.  
 Compensation practices differ across markets, but they all share the characteristic 
that their rainmakers can maximize their compensation over time by taking excessive risk 
in the boom.2  A Financial Times editorial put the problem as follows:  
 By paying huge bonuses on the basis of short-term performance when negative 
bonuses are impossible, banks create huge incentives to disguise risk-taking as 
value creation. Moreover, if bankers are rewarded for pursuing risky strategies 
that appear highly profitable for an extended period and then blow up, it is others 
who pay the costs. Given the extreme difficulty for outsiders, even top 
management, of monitoring the true risks being run, the result is a disaster just 
waiting to happen. But, of course, top management is itself part of the problem: it, 
too, has huge incentives to bet the bank. (“Curbing the excess of bankers’ pay,” 
March 7 2008) 
 
A Wall Street Journal article expressed a similar understanding of the dangers of 
perverse incentives. 
                                                 
1 In April 2007, one analyst at Standard and Poor’s said their ratings model “did not capture “half” of a 
deal’s risk… We should not be rating it.” A colleague responded: “We rate every deal. It could be 
structured by cows and we would rate it” (Moran 2009, p. 94). 
2 A detailed description of perverse incentive practices in different financial markets is provided in Crotty 
2008. 
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Bankers' pay must be regulated. The industry's one-way incentive structures have 
led bankers to run amok with other people's money -- contributing to the chaos in 
financial markets. When their bets pay off, bankers and traders carry home 
massive bonuses. When the bets crater, they don't hand those bonuses back. If 
bankers aren't forced to face the full consequences of their folly, the current mess 
will be repeated. (“Why Banks Need Pay Fix Compensation Practices Lack Teeth 
to Penalize Traders Who Lose Big,” March 11, 2008). 
 
 Alan Blinder stated the problem this way: “From the point of view of the 
companies’ shareholders [the rainmaker compensation scheme]… is madness.” Using a 
coin flip analogy in which heads represents a risky decision that pays off and tails one 
that leads to losses, he says that from the shareholders’ perspective:  
 the gamble looks like: Heads, we get a share of the winnings; tails, we absorb 
almost all the losses. The conclusion is clear: Traders and managers both want to 
flip more coins – and at higher stakes than shareholders would if they had any 
control, which they don’t. The source of the problem is quite simple: Give smart 
people go-for-broke incentives and they will go for broke. Duh. (WSJ, Crazy 
Compensation and the Crisis” May 28, 2009)3 
  
 Though almost everyone acknowledges that perverse compensation incentives 
were a major cause of the financial crisis, there has been surprisingly little serious 
academic analysis of the existence and reproduction of dysfunctional compensation 
practices in financial institutions. Why and how did these practices evolve? What 
explains the premiums paid to top financial employees relative to those working in other 
industries? Are rainmaker compensation practices consistent with the reproduction of the 
firm over the long run? Are they compatible with the interests of shareholders? Are they 
justified by exceptional long-term creation of shareholder value? Can it be shown that 
rainmakers have superior human capital as compared to top earners in other industries 
who make much less than they do? Or are rainmaker premiums rents, achieved not as a 
just reward for exceptional productivity but because rainmakers have the power to extract 
pay far in excess of their long-term contributions to shareholder value? If so, what is the 
source of this power?  
 The answers to these questions have important implications for the theory of 
financial firms and of financial markets, as well as for the debate over whether financial 
                                                 
3 As explained below, there are good reasons to believe that shareholders would not restrain risk-taking in 
the boom even if they could.   
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markets are “efficient” with respect to the setting of financial security prices and the 
allocation of real resources across competing uses. Answers to these questions can also 
help us better understand whether the rapid rise in inequality experienced over the past 
two decades has been driven by widening efficiency and productivity gaps among 
employees or, rather, has been primarily determined by relative power relations.  
We need answers in order to inform the current debate about government regulation of 
financial firm compensation. (Not surprisingly, rainmakers do not think tighter regulation 
a good idea.) Strong regulation of large financial institution compensation schemes is a 
necessary component of effective regulation, but, by itself, it cannot force financial 
markets to operate in the public interest. A more complete set of proposals for regulatory 
reform is suggested in Crotty and Epstein 2009.  
We know both the origin of, and the justification for, bonus-dominated 
compensation schemes in investment banking. Most investment banks began as limited 
partnerships. As such, the firm was solely devoted to maximizing the income of their 
rainmakers – the bank’s partners. Financial markets tend to be more volatile than most 
nonfinancial markets. The bonus system - in which a modest base salary is supplemented 
by a large but variable bonus whose size depends upon bank and individual performance 
has the distinct advantage that, if adequately elastic, it can quickly and substantially cut 
compensation costs in down markets to protect the integrity of the firm and shareholder 
profit. This is the primary justification used to defend the bonus-based compensation 
scheme used in financial markets. Though bonuses would rise substantially in financial 
market booms, they were supposed to also fall dramatically when markets crashed.4  
Moreover, in recent years the practice of granting investment bank rainmakers 
multiple year guaranteed bonuses and retention bonuses (ostensibly designed to prevent 
top rainmakers from moving to other firms) has blossomed. Guaranteed and retention 
bonuses demonstrate that modern bonus-based compensation schemes are not used for 
their original purpose because they do not decline with revenue and they are paid without 
regard to employee or firm performance. “A guaranteed bonus might strike many people 
as a contradiction in terms. But on Wall Street, banks have become so eager to lure and 
                                                 
4 It was also believed that a bonus system would induce partners to work as hard as they could, since each 
would get a piece of the extra revenue she generated, and that it would induce cooperation among partners 
because each partner shared in the fruits of every other partner’s labor.  
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keep top deal makers and traders that they are reviving the practice of offering ironclad, 
multimillion-dollar payouts guaranteed, no matter how an employee performs.” Even 
firms kept on life support by government funds continue to engage in this practice. In 
early 2009 Citigroup lured senior derivatives traders, a category of employee responsible 
for excessive risk taking in the boom, with multimillion dollar, multiyear guarantees. 
Meanwhile, government owned AIG will pay $281 million in guaranteed retention bosses 
to key members of its sales force (Dash 2009).5  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II presents and evaluates data on 
rainmaker compensation in investment banking. The data show that rainmaker 
compensation is very large and its asymmetric properties generate strong incentives for 
excessive risk taking in financial booms. Section III reviews the modest literature on 
financial market and investment banking compensation. It demonstrates that rainmaker 
premiums have been quite large in recent decades and that they can not be explained as 
returns to human capital – they are rents. Section IV discusses possible answers to the 
difficult question: where do the rainmaker rents come from and how are they sustained? 
The final section summarizes conclusions from this analysis.  
 
II. Rainmaker Compensation Schemes: The Primacy of Bonuses 
The most authoritative data on bank compensation practices in the recent boom 
and crisis were collected by New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, who 
published a report on the subject aptly titled “No Rhyme or Reason: The ‘Heads I Win, 
Tails You Lose’ Bank Bonus Culture” (Cuomo 2009). 
(http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%20Report%20Final%20
7.30.09.pdf)  His summary of the report’s findings is so important that I quote from it 
extensively. 
 Bonuses are supposed to rise when revenues rise, but then fall quickly when 
revenue declines sharply in downturns in order to sustain profit and protect shareholder 
interests in a very volatile business. That is the rationale for paying top employees such a 
high percent of their compensation in bonuses rather than as fixed salaries. Top 
                                                 
5 In announcing plans to regulate bonuses, French President Sarkozy stated that “guaranteed bonuses are to 
be banned” (Financial Times, Sarkozy tightens bonus rules,” August 26, 2009). 
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employees on Wall Street “typically make 90% or more of their compensation in year-
end bonuses (Wall Street Journal, “Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion Nine Lenders That Got 
U.S. Aid Paid at Least $1 Million Each to 5,000 Employees,” July 31, 2009, Susanne 
Craig and Deborah Solomon.) But Cuomo concludes that “even a cursory examination of 
the data suggests that in these challenging economic times, compensation for bank 
employees has become unmoored from the banks' financial performance. Thus, when the 
banks did well, their employees were paid well. When the banks did poorly, their 
employees were paid well. And when the banks did very poorly, they were bailed out by 
taxpayers and their employees were still paid well.” He continues:  
 Bonuses and overall compensation did not vary significantly as profits 
diminished. An analysis of the 2008 bonuses and earnings at the original nine 
TARP recipients [of $125 billion in government bailouts] illustrates the point. 
Two firms, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch suffered massive losses of more than $27 
billion at each firm. Nevertheless, Citigroup paid out $5.33 billion in bonuses and 
Merrill paid $3.6 billion in bonuses. Together, they lost $54 billion, paid out 
nearly $9 billion in bonuses and then received TARP bailouts totaling $55 billion. 
For three other firms -Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JP. Morgan Chase -
2008 bonus payments were substantially greater than the banks' net income. 
Goldman earned $2.3 billion, paid out $4.8 billion in bonuses, and received $10 
billion in TARP funding. Morgan Stanley earned $1.7 billion, paid $4.475 billion 
in bonuses, and received $10 billion in TARP funding. JP. Morgan Chase earned 
$5.6 billion, paid $8.69 bil1ion in bonuses, and received $25 billion in TARP 
funding. Combined, these three firms earned $9.6 billion, paid bonuses of nearly 
$18 billion, and received TARP taxpayer funds worth $45 bil1ion (Cuomo 2009, 
pp. 1-2).6 
 
Losses reported by Merrill totaled $35.8 billion in 2007 and 2008, enough to wipe out 11 
years of earnings previously reported by the company. Yet for the 11-year period from 
1997 to 2008, Merrill’s board gave its chief executives alone more than $240 million in 
performance-based compensation (New York Times, “After losses, a move to reclaim 
executives’ pay,” February 22, 2009). 
Taking a full-cycle view, Cuomo shows that while compensation did accelerate in 
the boom, it failed to shrink in line with revenue in the crash. Indeed, as earnings at key 
banks collapsed, it increased. 
                                                 
6 A major source of public frustration with the TARP program was the perception that banks who received 
government funds used them primarily to pay bonuses and dividends rather than to expand credit to the 
public as intended.  
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 For instance, at Bank of America, compensation and benefit payments increased 
from more than $10 billion to more than $18 billion between 2003 and 2006. Yet, 
in 2008, when Bank of America's net income fell from $14 billion to $4 billion, 
Bank of America's compensation payments remained at the $18 billion level …  
even though 2008 performance was dismal when compared to the 2003-2006 bull 
market. Similar patterns are clear at Citigroup, where bull-market compensation 
payments increased from $20 billion to $30 billion. When the recession hit in 
2007, Citigroup's compensation payouts remained at bull-market levels –well 
over $30 billion, even though the firm faced a significant financial crisis. (Cuomo 
2009, p. 2) 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers destroyed $22 billion of shareholder value as 
measured by the decline in the book value of equity. Yet compensation in 2008 was 
larger than in 2004 when the firm was profitable. “Lehman paid out $55 billion to 
employees in the decade to the end of 2008. Shareholders earned cumulative profits of 
zero, including the loss of all of their capital when the firm failed” (The Economist, July 
18, 2009 p 72, “Are investment banks run for employees or shareholders?”) 
After defending huge bonuses for rainmakers as good for shareholders because 
they are supposed to evaporate when revenues crash to protect profits, when revenues 
plummeted in 2007, Merrill Lynch simply switched its compensation philosophy so it did 
not have to slash bonuses.  
 For example, as Merrill Lynch's performance plummeted, Merrill severed the tie 
between paying based on performance and set its bonus pool based on what it 
expected its competitors would do. Accordingly, Merrill paid out close to $16 
billion in 2007 while losing more than $7 billion and paid close to $15 billion in 
2008 while facing near collapse. Moreover, Merrill's losses in 2007 and 2008 
more than erased Merrill's earnings between 2003 and 2006. Clearly, the 
compensation structures in the boom years did not account for long-term risk, and 
huge paydays continued while the firm faced extinction (Cuomo 2009, p. 2).  
 
Note that if all investment banks pay their rainmakers whatever competitors are expected 
to pay their rainmakers, there is no effective restraint on rainmaker compensation.    
 Cuomo concludes that the “repeated explanation from bank executives that 
bonuses are tied to performance in a manner designed to promote [long-term] growth 
does not appear to be accurate. Indeed, our investigation suggests a disconnect between 
compensation and bank performance that resulted in a "heads I win, tails you lose" bonus 
system” (Cuomo 2009, p. 2).  More recent data confirm Cuomo’s findings. According to 
the Wall Street Journal: 
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Major U.S. banks and securities firms are on pace to pay their employees about 
$140 billion this year -- a record high that shows compensation is rebounding 
despite regulatory scrutiny of Wall Street's pay culture. Workers at 23 top 
investment banks, hedge funds, asset managers and stock and commodities 
exchanges can expect to earn even more than they did the peak year of 2007, 
according to an analysis of securities filings for the first half of 2009 and revenue 
estimates through year-end by The Wall Street Journal. … Total compensation 
and benefits at the publicly traded firms analyzed by the Journal are on track to 
increase 20% from last year's $117 billion -- and to top 2007's $130 billion 
payout. This year, employees at the companies will earn an estimated $143,400 
on average, up almost $2,000 from 2007 levels. … Average compensation per 
employee [at Goldman Sachs] is on pace to reach about $743,000 this year, 
double last year's $364,000 and up 12% from about $622,000 in 2007, according 
to the Journal analysis. (“Wall Street On Track To Award Record Pay,” October 
14, 2009) 
 
These data demonstrate that it is rational for top financial firm operatives to take 
excessive risk in the bubble even if they understand that their decisions are likely to cause 
a crash in the intermediate future. Since they do not have to return their bubble-year 
bonuses when the inevitable crisis occurs, and since they continue to receive substantial 
bonuses even in the crisis, they have a powerful incentive to pursue high-risk, high-
leverage strategies. In recent years at least, these perverse incentives caused rainmakers 
to make decisions that helped create the global financial crisis.  
 Figure 1 allows us to take a longer view of the rainmaker-shareholder relation and 
changes therein, utilizing broad industry for all New York Stock Exchange firms rather 
than data from the Wall Street giants collected by Attorney General Cuomo. It establishes 
two important facts about the growth of Wall Street firms and the effects of their 
compensation practices on the firm and its shareholders over the period from 1985 to 
2008.7 First, it shows the enormous growth of industry profits in this era. The Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association reports that this growth was partly driven by 
total revenue, which was over nine times larger in 2007 than it had been in 1985 (SIFMA 
2008). Profit from 1985 to 1990 averaged about $2.5 billion annually. From 1991 to 1994 
it averaged $5.5 billion. In the first of the two recent financial booms, from 1995-2000, 
                                                 
7 The sample of firms that generates bonus data is not identical to the one that generates profit data, but 
they are sufficiently compatible to ensure that the size and rates of change of the variables are essentially as 
presented in the graph.   
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annual profit averaged $13 billion – over five times the size of average profit in 1985-90. 
There was a financial downturn in 2001-02 that cut profit, but at its nadir it was still 
about $7 billion. The next boom began in 2003, and in terms of total revenue generated 
by New York Stock Exchange firms, it continued through 2007. Total revenue rose after 
2003 and peaked at $352 billion in 2007, at which point it was 44% higher than it had 
been in 2000 (SIFMA 2008).  However, profit fell by $9.6 billion in 2007 as bonuses and 
total compensation rose relentlessly, and the high-risk high-leverage strategies that drove 
the revenue boom crashed in 2007 and 2008, leaving large losses in their wake. 
   Second, it shows that the relationship between bonuses and pre-tax profit 
changed substantially over time. The dominance of rainmaker interests became stronger 
toward the end of the period. Until the latest boom, bonuses were less than profit in years 
when profit was rising, although the relative difference between them declined over time. 
Starting in 2004, bonuses exceed profit every year. From 2004 through 2006, the gap 
between bonuses and profit became very large. In 2005, bonuses rose by $6.9 billion 
while profit fell by $4.2 billion – a reverse elasticity. Bonuses were 170% larger than 
profit that year. Compensation growth was now substantially eroding profit as the bonus 
system was successfully used by rainmakers to capture revenue that would normally be 
expected to go to shareholders. In 2006 profit rose by $11.4 billion while bonuses 
increased by $8.7 billion, so the gap narrowed, but at $13.2 billion was still very large.  
 The data for 2007 and 2008 reflect the bizarre character of the evolving rainmaker 
financial firm during the crash it helped create. In 2007 these firms collectively lost $11.3 
billion. To reward themselves for generating these losses, rainmakers paid themselves 
bonuses of $32.9 billion, an amount far greater than paid in any other year, with the 
exception of 2006. But 2007 bonuses were only $1.2 below the previous boom year. The 
bonus system clearly was not working as advertised. If bonuses had declined in 2007 to 
their 2002 level, a year in which firms made almost $7 billion in profit, these firms would 
have made $26 billion in profit in 2007. In 2008, the full force of the meltdown caused 
Wall Street to lose an estimated $35 billion dollars. Bonuses fell substantially, but at 
$18.4 billion they were about equal to the 2004 bonus total (when profit was $13.7 
billion) and exceeded every year of the late 1990s boom except 2000, when bonuses were 
less than $1 billion higher. Since this sample includes a large number of smaller 
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brokerage firms that did not take as much risk and use as much leverage as the 
investment banking giants, it makes rainmakers appear less voracious in 2008 then is 
suggested by the data on the largest investment banks presented in Cuomo 2009. For the 
big firms, revenue fell by more and bonuses by much less than was the case in this large 
sample. Recall that Citigroup paid out more money in bonuses in 2008 when it lost $27.6 
than it had in 2006 when it generated profit of $21.5 billion and revenue was $36 billion 
higher. However, the implications are qualitatively similar: rainmakers, especially at 
dominant firms, were endangering their firms and short-changing shareholders so they 
could maximize their own compensation.  
 Figure 2 compares estimated bonuses with net earnings (or profit) for the big five 
independent investment banks. (Financial conglomerates Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase 
also have giant investment banks. These seven firms dominated the US investment 
banking industry.) The information is taken from the Compustat data base. Since income 
statement filings with the SEC do not contain bonus information, bonuses are estimated 
to be 60% of total compensation, a standard industry assumption. Two of the firms 
essentially failed in the midst of the crisis and were taken over by other banks with 
government assistance. Merrill Lynch was absorbed by Bank of America after the 
government offered to pay up for to $29 billion of possible future losses associated with 
the takeover, and Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan Chase.8  The government 
permitted Lehman Brothers to collapse without arranging its takeover, a decision 
generally believed to have severely worsened the global crisis. For this reason, there is no 
available data on bonuses and profit for these three banks in 2008 in the Compustat data 
base. Cuomo 2009, however, shows that Merrill Lynch paid $16 billion in compensation 
and benefits in 2008 while suffering a loss of $27.6 billion dollars.  The Economist 
estimated that Lehman Brother’s net income was minus $22.5 billion in 2008 while total 
compensation was $6 billion, higher than in the boom year of 2004 (July 18, 2009 p 72 
“Are investment banks run for employees or shareholders?”). 
 Growth in earnings and bonuses since the early 1990s is impressive. Bonuses are 
always larger than net earnings, often by a substantial amount. Bonuses are especially 
                                                 
8 This reorganization of the dominant section of the US investment banking industry has increased the 
market power of the remaining firms, with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley now more powerful than 
ever.  
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large in the recent boom. More important, the data show that the bonus system failed to 
protect the firm and its shareholders in recent downturns. Bonuses generally fell by less 
than net earnings in the down years of 2001 and 2002. For Bear Stearns and Merrill 
Lynch, 2007 was a very bad year; the former saw net income drop by over 85%, while 
the latter suffered an $8 billion loss. Yet bonuses at Bear Stearns fell by only about 20%, 
while bonuses at Merrill Lynch declined marginally. In 2008 both firms self-destructed. 
Net earnings at Morgan Stanley fell by more than half in 2007, yet bonuses rose. 
Goldman’s net earning fell by about 80% in 2008 while bonuses declined by less than 
half and are on pace to hit record levels in 2009.9 Bonuses were higher than in 2004 and 
almost as high as in 2005, years in which net earnings were substantially greater than in 
2008. Morgan Stanley’s 2008 net earnings were significantly lower than in every year 
since 1997 – for example, about 60% below 2006 – yet bonuses were larger than in any 
year from 1997 through 2005. The shareholders in the two surviving banks were not 
appropriately protected by the bonus system in the crash, while the shareholders and the 
firms of the three banks that collapsed were destroyed by the bonus system because high 
bonuses squeezed profits and because the incentives associated with the system helped 
caused the collapse of the firms. 
It is possible to compare the direct and indirect effects of the rainmaker 
compensation system on the shareholders and the rainmakers of the big five investment 
banks. Collective rainmaker bonuses can be obtained by adding up the bonus values in 
Figure 2 over time. They obviously get very large in the late 1990s boom and much 
larger in the boom that followed. Bonuses stayed high even in 2007 and 2008. The lion’s 
share of the bonuses went to the top employees I refer to as rainmakers. Cuomo 2009 
estimates that in the disaster year of 2008, Merrill Lynch paid bonuses over one million 
dollars to 696 employees (the top four recipients’ average bonus was over $30 billion), 
                                                 
9Goldman defends its high bonuses in 2009 on the basis of good performance, but in the absence of 
massive government intervention it too would have failed, so this defense is vapid.  “In addition to the 
federal money it took last fall, [Goldman] benefited from the government’s bailout of the American 
International Group, being paid 100 cents on the dollar for its $13 billion counterparty exposure to the 
insurer, and it has $28 billion in outstanding debt issued cheaply with the backing of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation” (New York Times, July 14, 2009, “For Goldman, a Swift Return to Lofty Profits”). 
Moreover, investment banks have made substantial profit recently trading assets with the Federal Reserve 
at prices generally believed to be extremely generous to the banks. 
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Morgan Stanley gave million-plus bonuses to 428 employees (with a top four average of 
$18 billion), while 953 Goldman Sach’s employees received over $1 million bonuses 
(with a top four average of over $11 million). But gigantic or merely very large, the key 
point about rainmaker bonuses is that they never have to give them back no matter how 
badly the firm performs – even if it fails. Each year’s bonus gets added to those in 
previous years.  
What about the shareholders? They receive capital gains in periods when the 
stock price is rising as well as dividends each year. Their returns are thus very high in 
years of financial exuberance such as we experienced from the mid 1990s to 2006. But 
they also suffer large capital losses in financial downturns. In other words, while 
rainmakers keep adding to their wealth in good years and in bad, shareholder have to add 
the gains and subtract the losses. The standard way to measure shareholder gains over 
time is by calculating what is called the “cumulative total return” on the stock. CTR 
assumes you buy a stock at one specific date and hold it until another. The total returns 
calculation includes capital gains or losses over time (adjusted for stock splits) and 
assumes dividends are used to buy more shares. Figure 3 shows the simple average 
annual total cumulative return of the big five independent investment banks assuming the 
stock was purchased on the date indicated on the horizontal axis and held until March 25, 
2009. Financial market stock prices have rebounded since that time, but most analysts 
agree this rebound could not have taken place without the massive bailouts of financial 
firms that took place both in the US and in most of the rest of the world.  
Without an approximately $12 trillion dollar US financial market bailout 
accompanied by aggressive expansionary fiscal policy, most if not all large US financial 
firms would have crashed (New York Times, “Adding up the Government’s Total Bailout 
Tab,” February 4, 2009).  For example, the Fed along with the Treasury and the FDIC 
guaranteed $424 billion of losses on pools of Citigroup and Bank of America bad assets 
(Financial Times, “The Fed’s independence is at risk,” August 21, 2009). Even golden 
firm Goldman Sachs’ continued existence was in question. In mid-September 2008 
Bernanke warned party leaders on capital hill that the “last two big investment banks are 
under siege” (Moran 2009, p. 19). The fact that even the two surviving investment banks 
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would have failed had the government not rushed to their rescue is so important in this 
discussion that it is worth considering in some detail.  
 The US Federal Reserve is attempting to shepherd Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley – the last two members of the dying breed of large US investment banks – 
to safety. It is throwing its arms around the two companies both as a supportive 
regulator and as a provider of liquidity on exceedingly flexible terms. Bankers say 
the Fed has also been making calls to banks telling them not to take advantage of 
the precarious position of Goldman and Morgan Stanley to poach business, and 
sharing its concerns with foreign central banks. Sunday night’s announcement 
that the Fed had approved their application to become bank holding companies 
and ensure they had full access to emergency loans during the transformation 
process was rushed out in time for the start of trading in Asia on Monday. The 
Fed is trying to help to shield them from the sudden collapse of their funding 
model – using short-term collateralised loans in the repo market – and help them 
to make the transition to another business structure. The US central bank has 
taken aggressive steps in recent days to backstop the repo market, which was 
traditionally funded in large part by money market mutual funds, which are now 
retreating to safe assets. Goldman and Morgan were probably the biggest single 
beneficiaries of these moves, including the easing of collateral rules on lending. 
But the Fed wanted to ensure they had a credible new funding model – which will 
now include much greater use of deposits. … Analysts said the Fed moved to 
approve Goldman’s and Morgan’s application to become bank holding companies 
in record time. The US central bank – which will now be their chief regulator – 
has said it will allow them to phase in newly applicable regulations including 
those covering capital requirements rather than have to rush to comply with them 
immediately. By taking Goldman and Morgan into its embrace, the Fed appears to 
be making clear to the market that the two companies will be within the central 
bank’s safety net on a permanent basis and will have access for the foreseeable 
future to emergency liquidity. (Financial Times, “Fed moves to protect Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley,” September 22, 2008)10 
 
 In an article focused on the contribution made by the government to financial 
firms and markets that enabled the resurgence of profits and bonuses at big financial 
                                                 
10 Even former Goldman SEO Henry Paulson seems to agree with this perspective. “I have never been a 
proponent of [government intervention]” he said, but “there’s no way to stabilize the markets other than 
through government intervention” (Wall Street Journal, “Rescue Plan Stirs Calls for Deeper Intervention,” 
September 24, 2008). John Gapper, the respected Financial Times columnist, argues that Goldman is so 
politically powerful that there was never doubt that the government would come to its rescue, a situation 
which reinforced risk-taking. “A lot of people used to think that Goldman Sachs runs the US economy. 
Now we know it does. … Goldman has been one of the prime beneficiaries of recent interventions by the 
Treasure and the Federal Reserve. … Goldman got a helping hand from the government and stands to get 
another one while Lehman was – rightly in my view – allowed to fail and Bear Stearns’ shareholders were 
nearly wiped out. Would the Treasury and the Fed ever have allowed Goldman to follow and its partners to 
lose their wealth? I doubt it” (Gapper  2008). 
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firms after the first quarter of 2009, Financial Times columnist Francesco Guerrera 
explained:  
 Take debt guarantees. US banks (and General Electric) have issued a total of more 
than $280bn in top-rated bonds backed by the government since November, 
according to Dealogic. The programme will end at the end of October, but most of the 
debt has a three-year maturity, leaving financial groups to enjoy much lower funding 
costs until at least 2011. And if that was not enough, the state, through Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, is still subsidising banks by backstopping most long-term 
mortgages. But the biggest form of state support for the US banking sector is 
arguably its simplest. Near-zero interest rates allow banks to make a killing the old-
fashioned way: borrowing at low rates and lending at much higher ones. Judging by 
the Federal Reserve's utterances and the sickly state of the real economy, that giant 
prop will remain in place for the foreseeable future. Capital markets have also roared 
back thanks to (yes, you've guessed it) massive government help. … In this golden 
era, it is almost impossible for banks not to rake in profits. (Guerrera 2009) 
 
It thus seems reasonable to examine shareholder and rainmaker returns along the path 
that their firms’ market activities brought them, prior to the rebound caused by radical 
government intervention.11  
The top graph in Figure 3 presents nominal total cumulative return for the big 
investment bank shareholders. It shows that if you bought their stock in the early 1990s, 
you would have done very well indeed. However, if you bought the stock after 1996, you 
would have lost money on your investment. For example, if you purchased the stock in 
1998, by early 2009 you would have lost 66% of your original investment, while the 
rainmakers in these firms were accumulating tens and even hundreds of millions of 
dollars of bonus. The lower graph presents real or inflation-adjusted total cumulative 
returns. If you bought stock in the big five after 1994 you would have lost wealth. Buying 
in 1998 would result in a 77% loss of investment value.   
Thus, over the period of the two recent financial market booms when the 
rainmaker form of the big investment bank became strongly entrenched, rainmakers 
became phenomenally wealthy by following high-risk high-leverage strategies, while 
                                                 
11 William Cohen, an editor at Fortune, discussed the bonanza top bank executives received as a result of 
government bailouts.  “What is not hard to argue is that the smorgasbord of government programs and 
initiatives have helped insure the survival of [America’s largest banks] by restoring investor confidence, in 
turn boosting their stock prices and the value of chief executives’ stock holdings.” He points out that 
Goldman’s CEO had company stock worth $168 million at their low point in 2008 but in late September 
2009 their value had risen to $623 million. JPMorgan’s CEO saw his stock rise from $168 million to $503 
million as the result of government support of financial markets. (Financial Times, “Bank chiefs owe a 
personal debt to taxpayers,” September 22, 2009). 
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their stockholders were financially destroyed. “All this has reinforced the idea that 
banking is simply a gravy train for employees” (The Economist, “The bonus racket,” Jan 
29th 2009). Even Alan Greenspan, the most influential cheer leader for unregulated, free-
market ‘shareholder’ capitalism, eventually acknowledged that the system he championed 
left shareholders at the mercy of rainmakers. “I made a mistake in presuming that the 
self-interest of banks and others was such that they were best capable of protecting their 
own shareholders” (quoted in Mason 2009, pp. 118-19).    
  
III. Do Rainmaker Premiums Exist: If so, Are They Rent? 
 Given the vital importance of financial firm compensation practices to both rising 
inequality and the creation of financial instability in the current era, it is surprising that 
the academic literature on this topic is so sparse. However, there are a few articles that 
together show that the compensation received by rainmakers in investment banks and 
other financial firms is higher than the compensation of seemingly equivalent workers in 
nonfinancial firms, and that this premium appears to be a form of unearned rent. 
 Sum and Tobar 2008 mine the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW) data set, a joint statistical program of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
each of the fifty states, to demonstrate that the pay gap between elite Wall Street 
personnel and everyone else is very large and grew rapidly in the years leading up to the 
crisis. This data source is especially useful because it includes bonuses, stock options, 
commissions and profit sharing. Unfortunately, it only generates estimates of average 
earnings and thus sheds light on rainmaker compensation only indirectly.  
 The bulk of bonuses received by investment bankers appear in the first quarter of 
the year in the QCEW data. In the first quarter of 2007, average weekly earnings for 
employees in the investment banking and securities industry in Manhattan was $16,918, 
which was 19.1 times higher than the average weekly earnings for the country as a whole. 
Price-adjusted average weekly earnings grew by 21.5% between the first quarter of 2006 
and the first quarter of 2007 for Wall Street employees, compared to 2.5% for all US 
workers. The absolute increase in earnings was 136 times larger for investment banking. 
The authors note that “an industry that employed just under 5 percent of the city’s 3.5 
million wage and salary workers in the first quarter of calendar 2006 generated 62 
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percent of all of the gains in quarterly real earnings of [New York City] workers over the 
year” (p. 66-7). They also show that between the first quarters of 2002 and 2007, Wall 
Street, which employed 2.4% of all New York State payroll workers, accounted for 58% 
of the total state increase in earnings. Finally, they estimate that total Wall Street bonuses 
in 2006 and 2007 combined exceeded the total increase in the annual wage of the 109 
million production and nonsupervisory workers in the country between 2002 and 2007. 
 Paul Oyer 2006 provides important empirical support for the claim that highly 
educated employees of investment banks get paid substantially more than equally 
qualified people who work in other industries. His data base is several thousand graduates 
of Stanford’s MBA program. He assumes these MBAs have broadly equivalent human 
capital attributes. “The pool of potential investment bankers in a typical Stanford MBA 
[class] is relatively homogeneous…” (p. 23). Since investment banking is an extremely 
popular field among Stanford MBAs, Oyer argues that the percentage of new graduates 
who enter investment banking is chronically constrained by job availability or the 
demand side of the market. That is, he sees a chronic excess supply of potential 
investment bank rainmakers, a finding that conflicts with the conventional justification of 
high premium discussed in section IV – a chronic excess demand for rainmakers. During 
stock market booms, demand rises, so the percentage that enters Wall Street rises as well. 
“The data are consistent with a labor market where a large percentage of Stanford MBAs 
could be successful investment bankers [and] Wall Street demands more people when the 
stock market is doing well” (p.23).  In spite of what appears to be a chronic excess supply 
of Stanford MBAs who wish to be investment bankers, Oyer documents that those who 
do get Wall Street jobs get much higher salaries than those who enter other fields. The 
investment banking premium is stunning. 
 It is clear that investment bankers earn a substantial premium relative to other 
GBS alumni. The [annual] premium varies from about 60% for a new MBA on 
Wall Street relative to one in management consulting to over 300% for investment 
bankers fifteen years after leaving Stanford relative to an average alumnus with 
the same amount of experience in any other industry. … I estimate that a new 
MBA that goes to Wall Street can expect to earn between $2 million and $6 
million in discounted lifetime income (in $1996) relative to what he would earn if 
he took a job elsewhere” (p. 2).  
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 The first year premium over those who enter consulting, a prestigious and much 
sought job, is $71,000, while it is $115,000 over entrepreneurs and $98,000 over the 
catch-all ‘other’ category.  In the fifteenth year the corresponding differences are 
$578,000, $1 million and $937,000 respectively. Oyer notes that these are likely to be 
under-estimates of the Wall Street premium. “However, if anything, I would expect 
…that the income premium for investment bankers in Table 7 is biased downward 
because so much investment banking income comes through bonuses” whereas the 
income measure is salaries (p. 29). Since bonuses are the main form of rainmaker 
compensation often greatly exceeding salaries, this under-estimation must be extremely 
large.  
 What is the nature or character of these premiums? Oyer implicitly assumes these 
premiums are competitive equilibrium phenomena. He thus draws the only logical 
conclusion consistent with his assumption: “the wage difference is a compensating 
differential that roughly offsets the unpleasant parts of being an investment banker” (p. 
23). Though he suggests that there is always an excess supply of Stanford MBAs willing 
to work on Wall Street, investment banking nevertheless must be much more unpleasant 
than deep-pit mining since it takes a fifteenth year annual premium of from $578,000 to 
$1 million to get anyone to do it.  
 There are two important empirical papers that both document the existence of 
large compensation premiums received by top employees of financial firms and provide 
persuasive evidence that these premiums are rents rather than returns to human capital: 
Philippon and Reshef 2009 and Goldin and Katz 2008.  
 Philippon and Reshef has been widely cited in the press (a Google search turned 
up 950 references) both because the topic of excessive financial rainmaker compensation 
has received so much attention and because academics have provided little help in 
understanding this phenomenon. We therefore review their work in some detail. 
 There a number of important empirical trends unearthed in the paper. It utilizes 
average industry wages provided by the BLS Industry Accounts of the U.S. (These 
accounts thus provide no direct information on the pay of top earners). The authors show 
[figures 1 and 6] that the ratio of the average wage of financial market employees relative 
to the average wage in other industries was high in the 1920s through the early 1930s (an 
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era like our own, with light regulation, rapid financial innovation and a vigorous financial 
bubble), where it peaked at over 1.6.  It then collapsed through the early 1950s under the 
much stricter regulatory regime of the period, and continued to decline modestly through 
the late 1970s, where it approached 1.0. At this point, there was no premium. The ratio 
rose again through 1990 to near 1.2 in the aftermath of the deconstruction of the previous 
regulatory regime. It then skyrocketed through 2006, where, at 1.7, it exceeded the peak 
reached after the bubble of the 1920s. The authors conclude that the relative wages of 
financial sector workers exhibit a long-term U-shape that needs to be explained. It is the 
U-shaped relative wage profile that captured the interest of many financial 
commentators.12  
 The paper separates financial employees into three sub-categories: credit 
intermediation, insurance and ‘other finance.’ ‘Other finance’ includes commodity 
traders, investment funds and trusts, venture capital, hedge and private equity funds, and 
investment banks, and thus comes closest to the financial firms and rainmakers we are 
interested it.13 All three relative wage indices behave as the aggregate relative wage did 
through 1980, though the ‘other finance’ index actually was below 1.0 for much of the 
1950s and 1960s. After 1980, the indices for credit intermediation and insurance rise 
above 1.0, and eventually hit 1.5 in 2006; there were highly paid rainmakers in these 
sectors. But the relative wage for “other finance” accelerates to near 4.0 by 2006 – a 
ratio almost four times its 1980 value and two and one-half time higher its early 1930s 
peak. ‘Other finance’ clearly contained a disproportionate share of the rainmakers who 
gained most from the financial innovation and deregulation of the recent bubble. 
 The authors address the question of how to explain this U-shaped long-term trend. 
Using Current Population Survey data, they estimate wage regressions that include as 
control variables education, race, gender, marital status, urban residence, and experience. 
These regressions show that “individuals working in finance indeed earn more than 
                                                 
12 Though the share of GDP represented by financial firm compensation accelerates after 1980, rising from 
just over 4% that year to just under 8% in 2005, the share of employment, which grew at about the same 
pace as compensation through the late 1970s, peaks in 1987 at 4.6% and remains relatively constant 
through 2005. The rapidly rising industry wage bill combined with slow rising employment led to the rise 
in the relative wage ratio. See Philippon and Reshef 2009, p. 5 and  Figure 1.  
13 In 2006, the proportion of workers with at least a college degree was 54% in “other finance’ and 32% 
and 26% in insurance and banking respectively (p. 9).  
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observationally equivalent workers” in other industries (p. 24) by a percent that peaked in 
2005 at 20% - about four times its value in the years from 1967 to 1980. Given the 
pronounced differences among the relative wages in credit intermediation, insurance and 
‘other finance,’ it would be reasonable to assume that the ‘other finance’ premium is very 
much larger than 20%. The wage premium controlling for education alone is 40%. The 
use of CPS data creates a strong downward bias in these estimates because CPS incomes 
are top-coded – incomes above an arbitrary level are recorded as if they were equal to 
that level. CPS data “is not appropriate for the study of very high incomes” (Philippon 
and Reshef 2007, p. 3). The authors note that there are more top coded individuals in 
finance than in nonfinancial industries: twice as many in credit intermediation, 2.4 times 
as many in insurance, and 13 times as many in ‘other finance.’ Though they make a 
standard, modest ad hoc adjustment for this bias that is the same for all subsectors, it 
cannot eliminate the bias problem, especially for the top earners in ‘other finance.’ 
 The authors also construct a “benchmark relative wage series” for the financial 
sector based on a number of empirical factors that should influence the movement of this 
series over time, and compare it to the actual relative wage series discussed above. The 
difference between the actual and benchmark series is called the historical excess wage 
series. Figure 11 shows that the historical excess wage series peaks at about 33% in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, cycles around zero in the late 1950s through 1990, they 
explode upward to a 2006 peak of over 40%. 
 They conclude that relative wages rose in the post-1980s in large part because of 
deregulation: “the evidence points clearly towards a causal role for regulation.” An index 
of deregulation tightly tracks the relative wage series. ‘Anything goes’ deregulation 
unleashed innovation that led to the creation and trading of extraordinarily complex 
financial products such as mortgage backed securities, collateralized debt and loan 
obligations, and credit default swaps. These in turn required highly educated and highly 
skilled employees who could command very high compensation. “Deregulation increases 
creativity and innovation and increases the demand for skilled workers” (p. 4). Since 
these products were concentrated in ‘other finance,’ it is not surprising that this was the 
sector with by far the highest relative wage growth. But they also show that rainmaker- 
driven compensation growth was far greater than can be justified by the increased 
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demand for human capital in finance. “We find that 30% to 50% of the excess wage can 
be explained by factors other than individual ability,” and “conclude that a large part of 
the excess wages in [historical excess wage series] is due to rent” (p. 29). The Economist 
states their conclusion this way: “30-50% of the wage gap between financial and non-
financial workers between the mid-1990s and 2006 was the fruit of what they judge to be 
rent-seeking rather than genuine wealth-creation” (“Surviving the slump,” May 30, 2009, 
p. 17). The authors note that large rents “explain the large flow of talent into the 
industry,” but they do not explain what caused or sustained the rents (p.31). Since they 
find that “financial creativity” has been over compensated and believe that regulation is 
likely to be more restrictive in the future, they argue that the excess relative wage of the 
recent past is not sustainable.  
 From the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, and from the mid-1990s to 2006, however, 
the compensation of employees in the financial industry appears to be too high to 
be consistent with labor market equilibrium. Moreover, in the recent period, we 
show that this result remains even if we control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. This finding is prima facie evidence that the financial sector is not 
in a sustainable labor market equilibrium, and that short term rents area likely to 
diminish. (p. 5)  
 
 Thus, the academic study most relevant to the questions we have asked 
demonstrates that financial workers get paid much more than equivalent non-financial 
workers and that much of outsize rainmaker compensation is rent. But the source of these 
rents remains a mystery.  
 The data used by Philippon and Reshef are average compensation from the BLS 
Industry Accounts of the U.S. and CPS data that is top coded. This data thus do not 
permit an examination of the compensation of Wall Street rainmakers. To get information 
about the top earners in finance, they suggest we consult Kaplan and Rauh 2007, who 
examine compensation for investment bank high-earning ‘managing directors’ and other 
Wall Street rainmakers. They estimate that there are about 10,000 managing directors in 
the US, of which 6000 work for the top ten investment banks. They estimate that the 
minimum compensation inclusive of bonuses for managing directors was $500,000 in 
2004 and that the distribution of compensation is highly unequal. Total managing director 
compensation is between $19 billion and $28 billion, generating an average 
compensation in 2004 between $1.9 million and $2.8 million. We know that top traders 
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were making up to $50 million in 2006 and that some CEOs of the big firms at times 
made more than that. They conclude “that the managing directors and top executives of 
the top investment firms comprise a larger percentage of those individuals in the top 
0.01% [of AGI or adjusted gross income] … than the top executives of non-financial 
public companies” (p. 2).   
 If we combine the fact that some 10,000 investment bankers receive average 
compensation of more than $2 million annually with information about the pool of 
investment bank recruits, we can gain substantial insight into the character of their 
bonuses. Both contacts on Wall Street and acquaintances who teach at elite colleges that 
send large portions of their graduate to Wall Street tell me that investment banks do not 
generally recruit those students with the most impressive academic credentials. Rather, 
they look for students with acceptable grade point averages (perhaps B or B+) who have 
demonstrated exceptional aggressiveness or competitiveness. They want dominating 
type-A people, not exceptionally smart or well-informed people. For example, they 
frequently recruit lacrosse or hockey players.14  
 Though such hires may work hard and for long hours and compete aggressively, 
there is nothing in mainstream labor market theory that would lead one to expect that 
their would be 10,000 of them in investment banks who average over $2 million a year in 
compensation in 2004 – far more than those with equivalent and even superior human 
capital endowments who do not work on Wall Street and thus are not able to create asset 
bubbles. This situation thus can not be fully explained by the “Pavarotti effect” discussed 
in the “economics of super stars” or “winner take all” literature. This literature tries to 
understand professions in which a few super talented people earn huge salaries while 
everyone else is paid poorly. But tens of thousands of investment bankers receive very 
high compensation – at least a half million dollars annually - even as a small subset of 
them earn tens of millions or more. These premiums do seem to be primarily rents, and 
associated more with the positions themselves rather than the individuals who occupy 
them. 
                                                 
14 When the top investment banks were crumbling in the fall of 2008, the New York Times ran a story that 
asked whether the ultra-competitive investment bank lacrosse teams that played against each other on a 
regular basis might be forced to disband. 
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 Kaplan and Rauh 2007 show that the top earners in hedge and private equity 
funds make even more then their counter parts in investment banks. These firms had the 
same ability to ride the bubble as investment banks, and did not have to share the gains 
from this ride with shareholders. For example, the top 25 hedge fund managers received a 
cumulative $9 billion in 2005, an astonishing $360 million apiece. Stephen Schartzman, 
the major partner at Blackstone private equity fund, made $785 million in 2003 and 2004 
combined. The highest paid people in investment banks, venture capital, hedge and 
private equity funds constitute “at least 9.1% of those in the top 0.5% AGI bracket, about 
20% of those in the top 0.01% bracket, and approximately 26.5% of those in the very top 
0.0001% of the AGI distribution.” This represents a higher percent of the 0.01% bracket, 
a similar fraction of the 0.001% bracket and “a substantially greater fraction of the top 
0.0001% bracket than the top main street individuals” that control non-financial 
companies (p. 33). Using less conservative assumptions, the authors estimate that 
financial rainmakers could comprise up to 40% of the top category. I assume that date 
from the peak of the financial bubble in 2006 would yield even higher estimates. This 
means that financial firm rainmaker compensation policy was a significant cause of the 
spectacular rise in inequality that occurred in this era because most of this increase 
involves the very top of the income distribution running away from the rest of society.  
What makes this quite remarkable is that, as we show in section V, in the period from the 
middle 1990s until early 2009, financial firm rainmakers actually destroyed shareholder 
value. 
 Goldin and Katz 2008 provide information on the careers of groups of Harvard 
graduates with Bachelor’s degrees organized into three cohorts: those who graduated 
around 1970, 1980 and 1990. Their data shows a striking increase in the percent of 
graduates who took jobs in finance. While just 5% of the 1970 cohort entered finance, 
15% of the 1990 cohort did. Additional work by the authors show that the percent of 
graduates who entered finance hit “23% or so in recent years” (Lohr 2009). Perhaps the 
most interesting results of this study for our purposes is that it presents additional 
evidence that a substantial portion of the ultra high compensation of rainmakers in 
finance is not a return to any identifiable human capital. The authors regress annual 
earnings of 6,207 Harvard graduates in 2005 against an impressively large set of 
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variables. Control variables include grade point average, SAT math and verbal scores, 
college major, missing variable indicators for GAP and SAT scores, dummy variables for 
a number of advanced degrees, three full-time full-year work status dummies, and 19 
different occupation dummies. They find the “the highest earnings by occupation are 
garnered by those in finance, for which the earnings premium relative to all other 
occupations is an astounding 1.08 log points, or 195 percent” (p. 367, emphasis added). 
Highly educated employees working in finance receive a huge compensation premium 
relative to seemingly identical employees working elsewhere. The near 200% premium 
certainly appears to be rent.15  
 A related paper, Bertrand, Goldin and Katz 2009, examines the careers of 
University of Chicago MBAs who graduated between 1990 and 2006. The data are from 
a web-based survey done in late 2006 to mid 2007. Mean starting compensation (in 2006 
dollars, inclusive of bonuses) for all survey respondents (including investment bankers) 
was $126, 356, but for those who started in investment banking it was $173,740. After 
five years, mean compensation was $500,979 for investment bankers and $307,451 for all 
respondents. Ten year or more after graduation, it was $815,914 for investment bankers 
and $400,715 for all respondents – a premium in excess of 100% (Table 2, p. 31). This 
estimate may be biased downward because everyone who began their career in 
investment banking was treated as if they stayed in that category even though many were 
no longer in this field when the survey was done.16   
   
IV. How Are Rainmaker Rents Created and Sustained Over Time: Preliminary 
Thoughts 
                                                 
15 Barry Bosworth and Aaron Flaaen of the Brookings Institution argue that the huge payouts on Wall 
Street are “tremendous rents” (Bosworth and Flaaen 2009). 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0414_financial_crisis_bosworth/0414_financial_cr
isis_bosworth.pdf). 
16 The survey also showed that investment bankers reported an average work week of 74 hours a week, 
whereas those in other occupations reported hours in the high 50s to low 60s (Table A4, p. 49). This 
suggests that a part of their premium might legitimately be considered a compensating differential. 
However, given the enormity of the premiums, the implied cost of inducing the extra hours of work is far 
too large to be primarily a compensation differential. Since this was a voluntary internet survey and since 
investment bankers are known to be unusually competitive individuals, it may be that, without being 
conscious of their motivation, they exaggerated the length of their workweek to show how hard-driving 
they are.  
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How can such high rents for rainmakers in investment banks and other financial 
corporations be sustained over long periods? This important question for theory and 
regulatory policy has not been adequately addressed in the academic literature. This 
section presents some preliminary thoughts about the issue.  
 To answer the key question of how rainmaker rents can exist, be so large and 
sustain themselves over time, we have to address two sub-questions. First, why are 
investment bank and other financial firm revenues per employee so large in booms? 
Second, why are rainmakers able to capture such an exceptionally large share of 
revenues in good times and bad?  
 
IVa. Rents and ‘False Value’ in the Boom 
 The standard mainstream answer to the first question is that bonuses are not rents 
at all. At least in financial booms, employee productivity is exceptionally high and since 
rainmakers are the most productive workers, their huge bonuses are justified by the 
revenue they generate. Since the market capitalization, value added and profits of most 
financial institutions rose spectacularly after the early 1990s, while employment grew 
much more slowly, employee productivity as typically measured did rise dramatically. 
The spectacular rise over several decades in the absolute and relative size of financial 
markets, financial asset values and financial market profit were seen as macro evidence 
that supported this explanation. Francois Meunier nicely stated the problem associated 
with this standard explanation of investment bank compensation. Defenders of financial 
compensation practices claim that:  
 Employees are handsomely paid because they are extremely qualified and operate 
in a sector of the economy that is both rapidly growing and indispensable to the 
economy. Employees receive compensation equal to their productivity, which is 
extremely high. But this explanation does not hold. Other sectors beside finance 
show equally strong growth, are big consumers of technology and technical 
know-how, but their employees are not as highly paid as investment bankers. 
Pharmaceutical laboratories, aeronautics and the automobile and electronic 
sectors are examples… (Meunier 2007, pp. 53-54).17  
 
 There are several major weaknesses in the mainstream explanation. First, in spite 
of the fact that almost everyone now acknowledges that rainmakers took excessive risk 
                                                 
17 I am grateful to Grace Chang for translating Meunier’s article from French to English.  
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with their firms’ capital in the boom, their contributions to revenue or profit were not 
reduced by an appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital before setting their bonuses. 
Indeed, most rainmakers were charged no capital cost at all for purposes of bonus 
determination. "The overwhelming majority of banks used fairly basic profit numbers 
and did not adjust for risk at all” (Hughes and Masters 2008). The Economist noted that 
compensation in “the securities industry was based on revenue, not risk-adjusted returns.” 
This practice continued even as the crisis unfolded: “According to a survey of industry 
practices published by the Institute of International Finance in March [2009], many banks 
still fail to use risk-adjusted measures either to calculate the size of the bonus pool or to 
allocate it (The Economist, “Rebuilding the banks,” May 14, 2009, pp. 19 and 23).  
One of the central planks in French President Sarkozy’s model for the regulation of 
compensation in banking is: “the cost of risk must be included” in the determination of 
bonuses (Financial Times, “Sarkozy tightens bonus rules,” August 26, 2009).18 The Wall 
Street Journal reports that “the Financial Stability Forum has set out new principles, 
already adopted by the U.K. and France, requiring banks to base bonuses on risk-adjusted 
profits rather than revenue, defer awards for up to three years and allow for clawbacks” 
(“A Capital Idea for Bank Bonuses, August 28, 2009). Note that these principles not only 
require risk-adjustment, but also demand that profits, not revenues, be the foundation on 
which bonuses are determined. Had this principle been in place during the recent crash, 
Merrill Lynch would not have paid $16 billion in bonuses in 2007 while the firm lost $7 
billion. Matthew Richardson, France’s Minister for the economy, industry and 
employment argued that: “We should scrap this system for financial institutions and 
make it more risk-based - consider illiquidity risk, credit risk, funding risk, market risk. If 
these risks were taken into account, these trades would not show profits, putting an end to 
unjust bonuses” (Financial Times, “A curb on bank bonuses misses the point,” September 
9, 2009). Even the Fed agrees. It: 
                                                 
18President Sarkozy admitted that his proposals to regulate rainmaker compensation would be unsustainable 
if other important countries declined to follow his example because this would trigger “an exodus of 
bankers”- regulatory race to the bottom. The reaction of US financial economists was predictable. A 
finance professor at Dartmouth said the proposals were nonstarters, because they are “so fundamentally 
antithetical to the Anglo-American notion that compensation has to be a function of failure and profit” 
(Wall Street Journal, “France Will Police Pay, Bonuses of Traders,” August 26, 2009. Perhaps the 
professor was not familiar with the data on rainmaker compensation and bonuses in the crisis.  
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 “proposed that pay of traders be linked to the risks taken to achieve returns. So if 
two people generate $1 million in revenues each, the one who took more chances 
would be paid less. Analysts noted that one sure-fire sign of risk – bets that use a 
lot of borrowed money - could stay out of style if the Fed uses risk-adjusted 
returns to assess bow employees should get paid. (Wall Street Journal, “Fed Hits 
Banks With Sweeping Pay Limits,” October 23, 2009)  
 
Since rainmakers used large amounts of their firms’ capital to support their 
operations in an exceptionally high-risk era, an appropriate risk-adjusted capital charge 
would have been substantial, sharply lowering bonuses. No acceptable theory of 
appropriate compensation policies would justify this practice; it is a license to loot the 
shareholders.  
The main problem with the proposition that rainmakers deserve or earn their large 
bonuses in boom years because they create high value in those years is that it fails to take 
into account the ephemeral character of these revenues. I do not dispute the assertion that 
rainmakers create market value during the bubble. They are paid to identify, exploit and 
create serial financial asset bubbles that produce the escalating capital gains that are the 
source of their firm’s revenue and profit, and thus the ultimate source of their bonuses. 
They do these jobs brilliantly. However, to use this as a defense of the legitimacy of the 
bonus system, one must assume that the value of financial assets and the market 
capitalization of financial firms during the boom accurately measure the discounted 
future cash flows associated with them, or that the value rainmakers create is long-term 
rather than transitory value. A central tenet of the efficient financial market hypothesis is 
that financial market prices are always in rational-expectations equilibrium. But history 
demonstrates that financial markets move through time in boom-bust cycles around some 
variable trend. Financial assets are grossly over-valued in the late boom, as demonstrated 
by the subsequent bust, and under-valued in much of the bust, as demonstrated by the 
subsequent boom. So except when the cycle passes through the trend in one direction or 
the other, financial asset values and market capitalizations are not consistent with long-
term trends in cash flows. Thus, the only reasonable way to measure the long-term value 
creation that should be the determinant of bonuses in speculative financial booms is ex 
post, after the excesses of the boom have been eliminated. Note that since the government 
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has consistently bailed out financial markets in recent downturns, even measuring value 
creation by rainmakers via longer term trends grossly exaggerates their contribution.  
We have already examined the total returns to shareholders in the big investment 
banks over this period. Floyd Norris, a financial market columnist for the New York 
Times recently showed that an investor who held the stocks in the S&P 500 stock market 
index and reinvested all dividends received would have earned a nominal average annual 
return over a 10 year period ending in January 2009 of minus 2.6%. Adjusted for 
inflation, the average annual return was minus 5.1% (Norris 2009). These data suggest 
that investment banks and other financial firms were crucial parts of an economic system 
that massively destroyed shareholder value over the past decade or more. There was thus 
no financial or non-financial long-term value creation that could possibly justify the huge 
bonuses and stock options of the era. Compustat calculates a five year cumulative annual 
growth rate (CAGR) for its S&P 500 stock price index and key component sectors of that 
index. For the five years ending in early March 2009, the broad index has a CAGR of 
minus 9.5%, while the financials sub-section has a CAGR of minus 27.1%. In this period 
at least, owners of financial firm stock did much worse than owners of other sectors or of 
the broad index.  
The belief that financial rainmakers destroyed value is widely shared. Paul 
Krugman recently wrote: “The financial services industry has claimed an ever-growing 
share of the nation’s income over the past generation, making the people who run the 
industry incredibly rich. Yet, at this point, it looks as if much of the industry has been 
destroying value, not creating it” (Krugman 2008). Fellow Nobel Prize winner Joseph 
Stiglitz made a similar observation. 
 Even in the heyday of finance, there was a huge gap between private rewards and 
social returns. The bank managers have taken home huge paychecks, even though, 
over the past five years, the net profits of many of the banks have (in total) been 
negative. And the social returns have even been less - the financial sector is 
supposed to allocate capital and manage risk, and it did neither well. Our 
economy is paying the price for these failures - to the tune of hundreds of billions 
of dollars” (Stiglitz 2009).  
 
Veteran Financial Times columnist John Plender noted that “it is hard to argue with the 
proposition that the manic pursuit of … personal profit by bankers operating within 
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flawed incentive structures has been extraordinarily damaging for the economy and 
society at large” (Plender 2009).19  
 The recognition that the bonus system led to excessive risk-taking that was value 
destroying is the main reason why so many commentators, including the influential 
Financial Stability Forum, have called for annual bonuses to be held for long periods in 
escrow accounts, and reduced over time if the firm losses value in subsequent years as a 
result of excess risk seeking (Financial Stability Forum 2009, p. 12).20 Even Goldman 
Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein acknowledges that bonuses based on short-term value 
creation are undeserved and dangerous to the firm and the system. To prevent this 
problem, he suggests that: 
 An individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid 
excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to 
future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executives should be required to 
retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire… (Blankfein 2009) 
 
 The theory that best explains why it is that boom-bust cycles inevitably take place 
in capitalist financial markets can be found in the work of Keynes, Minsky and Marx.21 
Keynes’s theory is built on the core assumption of fundamental uncertainty: the future is 
not knowable in the present because it does not yet exist and it has not yet been 
determined. Agents can only guess where markets will go in the future and make choices 
accordingly. But these choices, made in ignorance, affect the system’s future trajectory in 
a dynamic path-dependent process. “Rational expectations” are not possible because the 
“fundamentals” of future states do not yet exist and thus cannot be known 
In a Keynesian world, expectations are formed “conventionally,” normally via 
extrapolation from the recent past. The longer these expectations lead to decisions that 
generate satisfactory outcomes, as they do in booms, the greater the confidence agents 
place in them. When a financial boom lasts for some time, agents begin to project its 
                                                 
19 McKinsey consultants agree. In a recent report it notes that: “The world’s equities lost almost half their 
value in 2008, declining by $28 trillion.” “Much of the rise in assets in mature markets did not reflect 
capital being channeled into economically productive activities; rather, it reflected growing asset bubbles.” 
(McKinsey 2009, pp. 10 and 21).   
20 Rob Parenteau suggested that such escrow accounts could be used to bail out these firms when crises 
threaten their solvency.  
21 See Crotty 1994 for a careful explanation of Keynes’s theory of financial volatility. For a defense of the 
proposition that Marx’s theory of financial market behavior has a great deal in common with the financial 
market theories of Keynes and Minsky, see Crotty 1985. 
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continuance. Given optimistic expectations of future prices, buying securities seems like 
a reasonable decision. As the boom proceeds and optimistic expectations are shown to be 
justified, buying securities with borrowed money also seems like a reasonable decision 
because optimistic expectations are held with increasing confidence or subjective sense 
of certainty. This drives the financial boom forward, raising leverage while raining 
capital gains on investors. The heaviest rain falls on the most aggressive investors. 
Objectively risky strategies are eventually considered safe.22 Since every long-term 
financial boom is accompanied by the widespread belief that we have entered a “new era” 
in which this boom will be permanent, eventually there is a near universal belief that high 
yields previously achievable only by accepting high risk can now be gained safely.23 
 The system eventually becomes, to use Minsky’s famous phrase, “financially 
fragile.” Expected future cash flows are increasingly contractually committed by 
household and financial and nonfinancial firms to financial institutions, while increased 
reliance on short-term financing makes financial firms especially vulnerable when crisis 
conditions erupt. Financial booms end when real-sector cash flows, whose growth is 
constrained by resource availability and technology, can no longer sustain boom-elevated 
security prices and dangerous leverage positions and/or when intra-financial-sector 
commitments cannot be met. The crisis can be triggered by any disappointing outcome in 
the real or financial sectors.  
 The central point is that from the perspective of the most realistic theories of 
financial market dynamics, the value created by boom euphoria, excessive leverage and 
dangerous risk-taking is “false value.” It cannot be permanently sustained by real sector 
cash flows and must disappear after the boom ends. Since ‘false value’ is the main source 
                                                 
22 Amromin and Sharpe show that the description of the Keynesian process of conventional expectation and 
confidence formation is the way investors in fact behave. “In forming expectations of future returns, 
household investors appear to extrapolate from recent-years’ realized returns. … [E]xpected returns appear 
to be procycylical” (Amromin and Sharpe 2009, p. 28). Boldrin and Peralta-Alva demonstrate that 
forecasting future dividends using past data as input to a distributed lag forecast – a forecasting method 
consistent with Keynes’s theory but incompatible with neoclassical theory – is far more accurate in 
predicting future stock price movement than using mainstream financial economics assumptions. “This 
assumption… can go along way in accounting for the secular trends of the U.S. stock market” (Boldrin and 
Peralta-Alta 2009).   
23 The importance of the “new era” syndrome in the generation of recurrent financial crises is stressed in 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009. 
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of excessive rainmaker bonuses, they cannot be justified as payment for contributions to 
increased economic efficiency and/or long-term economic growth. They are rents. 
 Britain’s Financial Services Authority makes the same point in its overall 
assessment of the causes of the crisis and appropriate regulatory responses. It argues that 
the increase in the relative size of financial markets relative to the rest of the economy 
“over the last ten to fifteen years, has also been driven by unnecessary and undesirable 
factors.” One is “illusory and the other harmful.”  
 The illusory affect can arise from mark-to-market profits in a rising market. … If 
irrational exuberance pushes the prices of assets to irrationally high levels, mark-
to-market accounting will swell declared profit in an unsustainable way. A 
significant element of trading book profits recorded in the years running up to the 
crisis proved in retrospect illusory. These illusory profits were however used as 
the basis for bonus decisions, and created incentives for traders and management 
to take further risk. … The possible harmful effect is rent extractions. For it seems 
that some and perhaps much of the structuring and trading activity involved in the 
complex version of securitized credit, was not required to deliver credit 
intermediation efficiently. … Wholesale financial services, and in particular that 
element devoted to securitized credit intermediation and the trading of securitized 
instruments, grew to a size unjustified by the value of its services to the real 
sector. (Financial Services Authority 2009, pp. 47 and 49, emphasis added)  
 
1b. Rents and Oligopoly Power 
 There has been a substantial increase in the market share held by a small number 
of the largest firms in important financial markets in the last quarter century that has 
enabled these firms to use substantial market power to increase revenue, profit and 
rainmaker bonuses. While speculative “false value” is the main source of money for 
bonuses, oligopoly-based market power is also a significant contributor to the money 
pool that feeds excessive rainmaker compensation.  
 The system-shaking problems in commercial banking in the 1980s and early 
1990s drove many firms out of that industry. From the end of WWII through 1979 there 
were only a few years in which the number of failures exceeded single digits.  But 
between 1984 and 2003, 2700 banks failed. As shown in Figure 4, as late as 1995, the top 
3 commercial banks owned about 12% of industry assets. A frantic merger process raised 
that figure to over 20% by 1998. By 2008, the top-3 banks owned about 36% of industry 
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assets. In 1995, the largest seven commercial banks in the US had about 22% of industry 
assets; their share exceeded 45% by 2008.  
Figure 5 shows that in 2001, the top five investment banks held an impressive 
50% of the assets of US brokers and dealers. By 2007 this ratio had risen to about 67%.24 
The share in total industry revenue of the top ten investment banks stayed within a range 
of 48 to 59 percent from 1980 to 2003, but hits 74% in 2007 (SIFMA 2008, p. 36) (The 
rise in concentration that took place in the aftermath of the crisis and subsequent 
government bailout is discussed below.) 
 The US Census Bureau publishes information on concentration every five years. 
Consider four firm revenue - not asset - concentration ratios for 1992 and 2002. 
(Unfortunately, the results of the 2007 survey are not yet available.) For savings 
institutions it was 12% in 1992, but rose to 31% by 2002. For investment banking and 
securities dealing, it was 32% in 1992 and 41% in 2002.  Several life insurance categories 
showed similarly high concentration. Concentration ratios in wholesale commercial 
banking and in important segments of investment banking are higher yet. Such high 
concentration ratios clearly make corespective or collusive behavior in key financial 
markets possible.  
 Inter-firm relations in these concentrated markets vary, with intense competition 
in some products and services, but corespective behavior in others. For example, there is 
fierce competition among investment banks for brokerage business narrowly defined – 
the buying and selling of financial assets for clients. Fees were fixed at a high level by 
agreement among large investment banks in the US prior to 1974, but thereafter 
conditions became more competitive and profit margins declined secularly. By 2006 it 
was widely claimed that investment banks were breaking even or losing money on their 
narrowly defined brokerage business. Other competitive markets include exchange traded 
derivatives and, in the recent boom, bank loans to hedge and private equity funds.  
 Conversely, the opulent fee structures of hedge and private equity funds suggest 
the absence of price competition. The general partners in private equity funds normally 
charge an annual management fee of about two percent of assets under management and 
                                                 
24 The size of the investment bank industry is taken from SIFMA, but this data base may not contain 
holding company investment banks and thus these concentration ratios may be biased upward. This would 
not materially affect the concentration trends.  
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receive a 20 percent share of the profits of the fund. They also charge firms they own 
considerable ‘fees.’ In a Financial Times article written to defend the efficiency of 
private equity funds, a former president and CEO of Morgan Stanley notes that “private 
equity’s notoriously high “friction costs” increase the spread between the rate of return 
on the fund’s assets and the return investors receive at 11 percent a year – a huge margin 
(“Private equity’s halcyon days are not yet threatened,” March 8, 2007, p. 11). According 
to Froud and Williams 2007, there is “little evidence of any competition on fee levels,” a 
view that seems widely accepted (p. 10). Such consistently high fees that earn fund 
general partners fabulous fortunes (that are taxed at low capital gains rate in the US) are 
simply incompatible with the assumption of intense competition. An identical argument 
can be made about lucrative fee structures in the hedge fund industry – also normally 2 
percent of assets and 20 percent of profits.  
 In 2007, the top three commercial banks in the syndicated corporate loan market 
controlled at least half the business. JPMorgan Chase had 29%, Bank of America had 
18%, and Citibank had 15%. (Berlin 2007, p. 2). In early 2009, the largest seven 
commercial banks wrote 98% of commercial bank originated derivates (FDIC 2009). It is 
also clear that the sustained existence of numerous shockingly high ‘fees’ to commercial 
bank customers reflects corespective behavior. Service charges on deposit accounts are 
the largest single source of identified non-interest income for commercial banks, while 
non-interest income now generates more than half of bank revenue.  
“Bounced-check and ATM fees are setting records. Consumers are paying higher 
service charges on interest-bearing accounts, Bankrate.com says. And banks that 
issue credit cards are increasing fees for late payments and over-the-limit charges 
to as much as $39 per violations. Make this mistake once or twice and your 
interest rate could hit 30%. ‘These are not things that are subject to price 
competition,” says Greg McBride of Bankrate.com.’” (USA Today, “Rising bank 
fees hit customers,” October 4, 2005). 
 
 Big investment banks do not use price competition in traditionally lucrative 
investment banking businesses like M&As and IPOs, where fee structures are well 
established. They can sustain profit margins because the three firm concentration ratio in 
global IPOs is 41% and the five firm ratio is 65%. Concentration is also high in the global 
M&A market (S&P Industry Surveys 2009). US investment banks face less intense 
competition than their European counterparts. The Financial Times reports that M&A 
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activity in Europe exceeded that in the US for 2006, yet cumulative fees for M&A work 
were almost twice as high in the US. “Despite the fragmentation of the European market, 
pricing pressures actually appear to be fiercer than in the US… In the US market, 
indigenous banks have held on to high fees, partly be fending off foreign interlopers… 
Higher fee rates mean American deals remain more lucrative.” (“Land of the Fee,” 
December 21, 2006, p. 14). Moreover, the lack of transparency in the lucrative over-the-
counter derivative market as well as the extreme asymmetry of information between 
banks who create and sell these instruments and the institutions that purchase them 
enabled banks to set very high profit margins on these profits.  
 Pricing power based on oligopolistic financial market structures and practices has 
added substantially to the pool of funds created by boom-induced ‘false value’ that are 
the main source of rainmaker compensation. A Financial Times editorial argued that: 
“inadequate competition failed to whittle away large profits – as enormous returns on 
equity showed – and therefore [failed to reduce] outsize compensation, unlike in other 
industries” (Public needs more bank for its bucks,” October 16, 2009). 
 
2a. Setting the Rainmaker Share of Revenue: why are rainmakers able to capture such 
an exceptionally large share of revenues in good times and bad? 
 In the rainmaker financial firm, compensation is at least 50% of net revenue 
(gross revenue minus interest costs) in the bubble and often much higher in the downturn. 
For example, compensation at Morgan Stanley was 72% of net revenue in the second 
quarter of 2009, as revenues plummeted while bonuses did not fall by much (Barker 
2009). This is much higher than in nonfinancial firms and represents a capture by 
rainmakers of revenue that could have gone to shareholders.  
One can easily understand how a partnership culture in which rainmakers believe 
that the goal of the firm should continue to be maximization of rainmaker compensation 
might carry over to the public firm from the partnership. But there is a crucial difference 
in the way pursuit of this goal affects performance in partnerships and public investment 
banks. Private investment banks have an incentive to limit risk and leverage even in the 
boom, because when risky decisions lead to large losses, it is the partners themselves 
who absorb all the losses. Before it went public in 1999, Goldman Sachs was a private 
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partnership. Most of the partners’ money “was tied up in the firm until they retired.” Not 
surprisingly, this restrained risk-taking; partners “took good care of their pot of gold” 
(Financial Times, “Goldman should be allowed to fail,” October 23, 2009).25 But when 
risk-seeking in pursuit of large bonuses in public investment firms eventuates in a 
collapse in revenue, rainmakers can deflect revenue losses onto shareholders because 
they control firm policy. In today’s public investment banks, rainmakers get large 
bonuses and shareholders get large capital gains in the boom. However, when the crisis 
hits, rainmakers still get substantial new bonuses and retain boom-era bonuses while 
shareholders are hit with large capital losses, wiping out much if not all of their boom-era 
gains.26 A Financial Times article captured the essence of the situation: “the crisis is a 
timely reminder that investment banking is a business where investors are engaged in a 
joint venture with employees. Shareholders should never forget that they are very much 
the junior partners” (Larson 2008, p 19).  
The new asymmetry in rainmaker compensation led to a substantial increase in 
the portion of bank revenues and profits that came from gambling with the firm’s own 
capital as opposed to fee generation for the provision of client services, even though fees 
rose as well. Goldman Sachs is a good example of this transformation. From 1996 to 
1998, traditional investment banking activity generated about 40% of the firm’s revenue, 
but in 2007, its best year, this source was responsible for just 16%, while gambling – 
trading and principal investing – generated 68% of revenue (New York Times, “Wall 
Street, R.I.P.; The End of an Era, Even at Goldman,” September 28, 2008). This shift to 
gambling substantially raised the risk associated with firm revenues. Indeed, one of the 
main reasons banks went public in this era was to be able to maximize the capital 
available for proprietary risk-taking. 
 The key question to be answered here is: given that this compensation system was 
a serious threat to the interests of shareholders as well as to the survival of the big 
investment banks, why were rainmakers allowed to maintain it? 
                                                 
25 The article notes that risky trading operations generated only a third of Goldman’s revenue in 1999, but 
this increased to two-thirds in 2006-07 and 78% in the first three-quarters of 1999.  
26Even in cases in which bonuses were paid in company stock with time restrictions on resale, financial 
innovation created transactions such as total returns swaps that allowed rainmakers to effectively convert 
these shares into other assets without actually selling them.  
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 It is clear that this system was a disaster for financial institutions. The big five 
investment banks all lost their independence. Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed; 
Merrill Lynch became mortally ill and was taken over by Bank of America; and Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley opted for financial conglomerate status to gain access to insured 
deposits, obtain substantial tax breaks, have the government guarantee their debt, and be 
eligible for government bailouts. It is now clear that only massive government 
intervention, estimated as high as $12 trillion or more if we include loans, capital 
infusions, debt guarantees and purchases of damaged financial assets at excessive prices 
prevented the entire financial system from collapsing. There are four sets of agents and 
one market process that had the potential ability to force a more appropriate 
compensation system on the firm: shareholders, top executives, capital markets, 
government regulators and market competition. Yet none of them did so. Why not? 
Shareholders: Why didn’t shareholders prevent the use of a compensation scheme that 
threatened their interests? Mainstream financial market theory cannot explain the 
reproduction over a long period of time of a compensation system structured to allow 
rainmakers to loot shareholders and threaten the existence of the firm itself. Of course, 
there are many papers that discuss principal-agent conflict in financial firms. But they 
conclude that these lead only to minor imperfections that prevent financial markets from 
fully attaining perfect efficiency. I know of no paper in a respected mainstream journal 
that concludes that the rainmaker-shareholder conflict is so severe that it destroys any 
claim to financial market efficiency, and thereby negates the core claim of canonical 
neoclassical theories of financial markets such as the capital asset pricing model and 
options pricing theory. A rainmaker-run system will generate lower risk-adjusted long-
term shareholder returns and higher systemic risk than in idealized mainstream models of 
financial markets because there will be too much leverage, credit will be misallocated, 
and financial markets will suffer from excessive volatility. And financial markets will 
utilize more resources than can be justified on efficiency grounds. Yet even the 
behavioral financial theory critics of efficient financial market theory fail to acknowledge 
the severity of these problems. “The behavioral finance literature… simply adopts the 
neoclassical view with biases added (e.g., overshooting, undershooting, framing, etc.” 
(Findlay and Williams 2008-09, p. 224). 
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 Keynesian theory can help solve the puzzle represented by the existence of the 
rainmaker financial firm because it has no paradigmatic commitment to demonstrate that 
financial markets are efficient. Though the data clearly show that existing compensation 
schemes induce behavior that is inconsistent with objective shareholder interests, 
Keynesian theory suggests that in financial booms, shareholders are likely to believe that 
rainmaker compensation practice  are consistent with their perceived or subjective 
interests. During the boom, most shareholders, relying on conventionally-determined 
optimistic expectations, believe that the spectacular capital gains of the period are 
realistic reflections of buoyant future economic conditions. They therefore may be 
perfectly happy with investment bank risk-taking practices even though these practices 
are objectively counter to their longer term interests. In the midst of boom euphoria most 
people fail to understand that their banks are taking excessive risk. Thus, from a 
Keynesian perspective, the question of why and how rainmaker financial corporations are 
able to act against objective shareholder interests for years or even decades need not 
arise: shareholders are usually happy with their banks in the bubble. If you bought Merrill 
Lynch stock at $6.50 at the end of 1994, or even at its cycle-peak price of $14 at the end 
of 2000, you would have been thrilled in late 2006 when the stock reached $47 
(http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=BAC&a=04&b=29&c=1986&d=07&e=11&f=2009&g
=m&z=66&y=66).27  
 The overwhelming majority of shareholders probably did not want the firm to 
change compensation or any other policies in 2006. And the near universal belief of the 
business press, financial advisors, government regulators, and economists at the time was 
that the boom was based on sound fundamentals. Of course, a Keynesian perspective also 
implies that free financial markets are inherently unstable and dangerous to the economy 
and society. They therefore need to be tightly regulated by the government at all times, a 
decidedly non-mainstream conclusion.  
 A complete answer to the question of why shareholders did not restrain rainmaker 
greed must include the fact that most of the equity in US firms is held by financial 
intermediaries assumed to be acting in the interest of individual investors. In the 
                                                 
27 The price is adjusted for stock splits and dividends. It thus shows how much the value of an initial stock 
purchase changes over time. 
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immediate post WWII era, households owned most stock and were long-term owners 
concerned with long-term returns. In the 1950s households owned 90% of stocks and 
held their stock for about a decade. Moreover “up until the mid-1960s, when the mutual 
fund business first exploded, [even] the average holding period in a professionally 
managed fund was seven years” (Fox 2009, p. 280). As recently as 1996, the household 
share was 50% (SIFMA 2008, p. 72). By 2007, financial institutions held 75% of US 
stock and held their stock for a short time. The turnover rate on the New York Stock 
Exchange exceeded 100% in five of the six years between 2002 and 2007, hitting 123% 
in the final year (SIFMA 2008, p. 49). This implies that the time horizon of 
intermediaries is very short. Thus, as long as they believe the boom may last for another 
year or more, institutions will keep buying stock. Hedge funds are notoriously short-term 
traders and it was recently reported that “high-frequency trading” – computer executed 
trades that are usually reversed in milliseconds - “accounts for as much as 73 per cent of 
US daily equity volume, up from 30 per cent in 2005” (Mackenzie 2009). Yet objective 
shareholder interests and economic efficiency require that financial firms have a longer 
term planning horizon. 
Crotty 2008 explains that key decision makers in institutional investors such as 
mutual funds have perverse incentives similar to those of investment bank rainmakers 
that lead them to buy and hold rainmaker financial firm stock in booms - whether their 
own expectations are optimistic or pessimistic. They are not only short-term 
shareholders, but risk-loving shareholders as well, at least in boom periods. 
Compensation for those who run institutional investment companies rises with assets 
under management. This encourages firms to seek maximum growth, which in turn 
requires that they seek a maximum rate of return on assets. Since high returns induce 
investors to put their money in the firm, which increases the size of assets under 
management, there are strong reasons to pursue high-risk high-return stocks in the boom. 
This is especially the case in periods in which financial asset prices have been rising for 
some time, because the longer the boom, the more likely it is that investors will believe 
that high-return-chasing is not a risky strategy. Their own incentive structure thus leads 
institutional investors to buy rather than sell stock in rainmaker financial corporations in 
the boom, reinforcing the risk-taking embedded in the rainmaker bonus system. 
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 The positive incentives for intuitional investors to support rainmaker policies are 
reinforced by competitive pressures facing these firms. Institutional investment 
management is a very competitive business. Contracts to manage pension fund assets are 
awarded to those firms with above-average returns on assets. Contracts may be 
withdrawn from any firm whose returns are below average for a period as short as six to 
nine months. Thus, even if a mutual fund understood that holding shares of rainmaker 
financial corporations in the boom was likely to lead to large losses in the intermediate 
run, it would be rational to hold these shares anyway in order to protect against the loss of 
large contracts. When financial markets crash and all such firms lose money, no 
individual firm will see their contracts removed as long as their losses are not 
substantially above the industry average. Rajan 2005 cites empirical evidence that mutual 
firms gain more from above-average returns in the boom, then they lose from below-
average returns in the bust. Eric Tymoigne argues that institutional investors “behave 
rationally in the sense that stiff competition and short-term incentives to reach money-
return targets push them to do whatever is legally (and sometimes illegally) possible to 
maintain market share” (Tymoigne 2009, p. 16, emphasis in original). 
 We conclude that shareholders cannot restrain the excesses of rainmaker 
compensation schemes. There is, however, an additional problem. The relatively short 
time horizon of the typical rainmaker, who can maximize expected discounted 
compensation by riding the boom even if this crashes the firm, combined with the very 
short time horizon of the ‘average’ shareholder, minimizes the probability that the firm 
will reproduce itself over time. Short-term owners will support short term speculative 
investment decisions that would – in the absence of recurrent government rescue efforts - 
threaten the survival of the firm over the long term. (Keep in mind that all the big 
investment banks would have failed in the recent crisis if governments around the world 
had not engaged in extraordinary rescue efforts.) They will also oppose investments that 
only bear fruit in the intermediate and long run – investments that are crucial for long-
term economic efficiency. Alex Edmunds and Xavier Gabaix 2009 put the problem of 
short-term rainmaker horizons this way:  
 Existing schemes have two main problems. First, stock and options typically have 
short vesting periods, allowing executives to “cash out” early. For example, 
Angelo Mozilo, the former CEO of Countrywide Financial, made $129 million 
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from stock sales in the twelve months prior to the start of the subprime crisis. This 
encourages managers to pump up the short-term stock price at the expense of 
long-run value – for instance by originating risky loans, scrapping investment 
projects, or manipulating earnings – because they can liquidate their holdings 
before the long-run damage appears.  
 
Top Executives: In textbook descriptions of firm governance, the CEO and other top 
executives are directly responsible for the long-term health of the firm and are supposed 
to make sure that the interests of the owners are paramount. Everyone who paid attention 
to the accounting scandals of the late 1990s understands that the textbook story is a fable. 
Top executives in firms such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom made decisions that 
enriched them, but led to the destruction of their firms and the collapse in the value of 
their stock. Aided and abetted by their bankers (who created nontransparent special 
purpose entities to hide risk) and accountants (who lied about their financial health), these 
executives deliberately kept from shareholders information needed to anticipate the 
coming disaster.  
 The compensation practices of rainmaker financial firms align the material 
interests of top executives with those of rainmakers. It was noted above that Lehman 
Brothers CEO Richard Fuld received almost half a billion dollars in compensation in the 
long financial expansion from1993 to 2007. Even if they run their firms into the ground 
and are fired, top CEOs often get huge payoffs. Stan O’Neill at Merrill Lynch received 
$166 million as a going away present, Charles Prince, the CEO of Citigroup, was paid 
$68 million upon his release after the firm’s collapse, and CountryWide offered CEO 
Angelo Mozilo $115 million after the firm failed and was taken over by Bank of 
America.28 Mozilo had been paid $471 million in his five year reign as CountryWide 
CEO.  
Indeed, it has been argued persuasively that the main job of a CEO is to keep the 
firm’s rainmakers, not its shareholders, happy.29 Michael Lewis, an insightful critic of 
Wall Street with a great sense of humor, offered the following qualifications for a Wall 
Street CEO. 
                                                 
28 Mozilo’s payoff was lowered due to pressure from Congress.  
29 It is also true that when individual bonuses are being determined, most rainmakers fight with top 
executives and each other over the size of their bonuses. Nevertheless, top executives have to keep their 
key rainmakers happy to achieve their own goals.  
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 The Wall Street CEO must possess an extraordinary ability to be paid huge sums 
of money each year without losing composure. This isn't as easy as it sounds, 
especially when the firm is losing billions. … The Wall Street CEO must quickly 
see where his interests, and those of his most ambitious underlings, differ from 
those of his shareholders. He must then navigate a tricky course: maximizing his 
own interests, and the interests of his most ambitious -- and thus to him most 
dangerous -- underlings, without attracting shareholders' attention. … [CEOs must 
gamble] big time with shareholders' capital. If the gamble pays off, the CEO and 
his underlings take home giant bonuses at the end of the year. If the gamble fails, 
the CEO takes home his nine-figure severance package and five years use of the 
corporate jet. His underlings move up in the firm, or get reassigned, or leave and 
join other firms -- where, if they're working for a CEO who knows the game, they 
get to make the gamble all over again. Sooner or later, it's going to pay. (Lewis 
2007) 
 
The CEOs of giant financial firms generally have no detailed knowledge of how 
their employees make money for the firm and most have no knowledge at all about the 
complex products such as mortgage backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and 
credit default swaps that generated much of the firm’s revenue in the recent boom. They 
also do not know how the company’s statistical risk management techniques operate and 
normally have little if any contact with corporate risk-management officers.30 Their 
positions change so rapidly and the financial instruments they hold are so complex and 
opaque that not even the best Chief Financial Officers have more than a vague 
assessment of risk at any point in time. Michael Lewis made this point forcefully.  
There is, of course, a reason that the market doesn't understand Wall Street firms: 
The people who run Wall Street firms, and who convey news of their inner 
workings to the outside world, don't understand them either. Jimmy Cayne [CEO 
of Bear Stearns] plays bridge, and Stan O’Neill [CEO of Merrill Lynch] golfs 
while their firms collapse, not because they don't care their firms are collapsing, 
but because they don't know that their firms are collapsing. Across Wall Street, 
CEOs have made this little leap of faith about the manner in which their traders 
are making money, because they don't fully understand what their traders are 
doing. Late last November, in a superb account of the demise of Citigroup CEO 
Charles Prince, Carol Loomis of Fortune magazine revealed that Prince resigned 
                                                 
30 Banks have risk managers whose job is to measure risk and warn top management whenever rainmakers 
are making decisions that involve what the manager believes to be excessive risk. However, if risk 
managers repeatedly warn of excessive risk in the heat of the boom, threatening to kill the geese laying 
Golden Eggs, they are sure to be ignored and likely to be demoted or fired. Former IMF chief economist 
Simon Johnson and a colleague put the matter this way. “Imagine the situation of the chief risk manager of 
a bank in, say, 2004.” If he “tried to reduce his bank’s exposure to structured securities such as 
collateralized debt obligations, he would be out of a job” (Simon Johnson and James Kwak, “Seduced by a 
Model,” New York Times, October 1, 2009).   
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after he was informed of the consequences of liquidity puts -- options that allowed 
buyers of complex and presumably safe mortgage securities to hand them back to 
Citigroup at par if they became hard to finance.31 Liquidity puts were about to 
make Citigroup the new owner of $25 billion of crappy mortgage securities at par, 
cost Prince his job, and put the company into the hands of Robert Rubin. Rubin is 
an extremely smart man with keen instincts of self- preservation, and he sat closer 
to Prince than anyone else at Citigroup. Rubin said he had never heard of liquidity 
puts. To both their investors and their bosses, Wall Street firms have become 
shockingly opaque. (Lewis 2009) 
 
 Lewis then argues that the inability of CEOs to understand what their 
rainmakers do, even thought their own compensation depends on the success of how well 
rainmakers perform, began in the dawn of the new era on banking.  
But the problem isn't new. It dates back at least to the early 1980s when one firm, 
Salomon Brothers, suddenly began to make more money than all the other firms 
combined. (Go look at the numbers: They're incredible.)  The profits came from 
financial innovation -- mainly in mortgage securities and interest-rate arbitrage. 
But its CEO, John Gutfreund, had only a vague idea what the bright young things 
dreaming up clever new securities were doing. Some of it was very smart, some 
of it was not so smart, but all of it was beyond his capacity to understand. Ever 
since then, when extremely smart people have found extremely complicated ways 
to make huge sums of money, the typical Wall Street boss has seldom bothered to 
fully understand the matter, to challenge and question and argue. This isn't 
because Wall Street CEOs are lazy, or stupid. It's because they are trapped. The 
Wall Street CEO can't interfere with the new new thing on Wall Street because 
the new new thing is the profit center, and the people who create it are mobile. 
Anything he does to slow them down increases the risk that his most lucrative 
employees will quit and join another big firm, or start their own hedge fund. He 
isn't a boss in the conventional sense. He's a hostage of his cleverest employees” 
(Lewis 2009).  
  
 Thus, the only way CEOs can keep the revenue and profit flowing in the boom, 
thereby maximizing their compensation, is by giving the firm’s rainmakers, the people 
who do know how to make money, large enough bonuses to retain their loyalty to the 
firms.  
                                                 
31 These liquidity puts are an excellent example of the perverse nature of the bonus system. When buyers of 
structured financial products such as CDOs became concerned that their short-term financing mechanisms 
might dry up, originating investment banks offered to buy them back in the event this happened. This 
allowed the banks to sell the CDOs even in difficult times. The bank rainmakers received their bonuses for 
selling the CDOs even as the likelihood they would have to take them back at a loss increased. When this 
happened, the rainmakers kept the bonuses even though there was no revenue gain for the firm.  
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 Banks do have risk managers whose job is to measure risk and warn top 
management whenever rainmakers are making decisions that involve what the manager 
believes to be excessive risk. However, if risk managers repeatedly warn of excessive 
risk in the heat of the boom, threatening to kill the geese laying Golden Eggs, they are 
sure to be ignored and likely to be demoted or fired. Former IMF chief economist Simon 
Johnson and a colleague put the matter this way. “Imagine the situation of the chief risk 
manager of a bank in, say, 2004.” If he “tried to reduce his bank’s exposure to structured 
securities such as collateralized debt obligations, he would be out of a job” (Simon 
Johnson and James Kwak, “Seduced by a Model,” New York Times, October 1, 2009).  
In 2008, The Economist published an article called “Confessions of a risk 
manager” in which a risk manager at a major financial institution explained why those in 
his position were unable to restrain excessive risk-taking by their firm’s rainmakers 
during the bubble. Some of the problems seemed to be a combination of incompetence, 
naiveté and disingenuousness. “Our risk-management response [to excessive risk-taking] 
was half-hearted,” he said. We “left the trading desks to their own devices.” “We also 
trusted the ratings agencies. … It was assumed the ratings agencies simply know best.” 
But the main problem was structural – tremendous pressure by the firm’s rainmakers not 
to interfere with the risk-taking that generated the money for their giant bonuses. “The 
pressure on the risk department to keep up and approve transactions was immense.” In 
the eyes of the rainmakers:  
we were not earning money for the bank. Worse, we had the power to say no and 
therefore prevent business from being done. Traders saw us as obstructive and a 
hindrance to their ability to earn higher bonuses. They did not take kindly to this. 
… Most of the time the business line would simply not take no for an answer, 
especially if the profits were big enough. (The Economist 2008) 
 
Boards of Directors: The Board of Directors is the body legally obligated to ensure that 
the corporation operates in the interests of its stockholders. But in fact they are controlled 
by top management. Board members are generally appointed by the CEO, who is not 
likely to appoint people who oppose his policies and is likely to get rid of those who do. 
Boards meet infrequently and Board members have limited information about the inner 
workings of the firm. Board members responsible for overseeing top executive 
compensation normally rely on outside consultants who are most likely to be rehired if 
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they make compensation awards that please the CEO. It is always assumed that the firm 
has above-average top executives, so consultants suggest above industry average 
compensation, the effect of which is to constantly ratchet up average CEO 
compensation.32 Moreover, Boards failed to prevent the widespread practice of allowing 
top executives to ‘backdate’ their stock options, changing the date at which they were 
originally granted to a prior date when the stock price was substantially below the current 
price, putting their options ‘in the money.’33 There is no realistic hope that Boards of 
Directors will be the agents who restrain rainmaker compensation, thereby reducing their 
incentive to take excessive risk. 
Capital Markets: We have seen that neither institutional nor individual holders of equity 
capital restrain the compensation schemes of rainmaker financial firms. However, the 
financial firms we have been analyzing are highly leveraged institutions. Thus, their 
ability to grow over time is strongly influenced by those individuals and institutions that 
provide debt capital to the firm and thereby codetermine the quantity of borrowed funds 
available to the firm and the cost of this capital.  
 The main forms of borrowed funds that fueled the spectacular growth of 
investment banks in the past two decades were ‘repos’ (sale and repurchase agreements) 
and ‘security credit from households’ – both short-term sources of finance.  A repo is a 
transaction in which the borrower sells a security to the lender with the promise to 
repurchase it in the near future at a price above the sale price. This price differential 
generates an interest yield on the loan. It is, in effect, a collateralized loan, with the 
security as the collateral. In 2007, according to Federal Reserve flow of funds data, net 
                                                 
32 There is a substantial literature on dysfunctional compensation schemes for top executives of 
nonfinancial firms that induced them to maximize short-term stock price increases to the detriment of the 
long term health of the firm because pay was dominated by stock options. CEOs are rewarded with opulent 
pay packages when their firms generate high revenues and profit in expansions and, like rainmakers, are 
still paid handsomely when markets crash. When stock prices fall, wiping out the value of recently granted 
stock options, top executives simply backdated their options to a time when stock prices were even lower, 
thus making their options valuable once again. Of course, this was illegal. As a result of increasingly 
generous pay schemes for top executive centered on stock options since the late 1980s, and the secular rise 
of stock prices over the past two decades, top executive pay has skyrocketed. The ratio of average CEO 
compensation to the pay of the average worker was in the mid-20s in the 1960s, in the mid-30s in the late 
1970s. It accelerated rapidly after 1980, hitting 299 in 1998 and was still 275 in 2006 (Bernstein, Mischel 
and Shierholz 2009, p. 221). 
33 See for example “Backdating Likely More Widespread,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2009. This 
article discusses a recent study that identified “141 companies with such advantageous options-granting 
practices that the researchers concluded they were highly likely to have been involved in backdating.” 
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repos were 38% of total investment bank liabilities. Other estimates are higher. “The 
former top US investment banks funded roughly half of their assets using repo 
markets…” (Gorton and Metrick 2009, p. 10).  
 Lenders in the repo market are primarily institutional investors such as mutual 
funds, pension funds, banks and large nonfinancial firms. They often have substantial 
sums of money that they do not intend to invest in longer term assets in the immediate 
future. Since there is a limit on the size of bank deposits that are insured by the 
government, large institutions need a safe, short-term interest-bearing form in which to 
hold their money. In normal times, repos are safe because they are collateralized, and 
often over-collateralized, with safe securities. A $40 million dollar repo loan may involve 
$50 million worth of securities as collateral: the difference is called the “haircut.” 
Lenders were quite content to get an attractive interest rate on the seemingly well-
collateralized overnight use of their funds in the boom, and therefore happily provided 
large investment banks with huge amounts of relatively cheap financing for the growth of 
their business in recent booms.34  
 According to the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the “primary dealers” of 
Treasury securities, which recently included four of the five independent investment 
banks and several of the large investment banks that were part of financial 
conglomerates, had repo liabilities of about $1.5 trillion in 2000 and a mere $450 billion 
in 1994.35 This rose dramatically to about $4.5 trillion in 2008. Moreover, from the late 
1990s through 2003, about half the repos issued by primary dealers were overnight loans, 
but this increased to almost two-thirds by mid-2008. In addition, while the most common 
forms of repo collateral are Treasury securities and agency securities, in the recent boom 
investment banks increasingly used private mortgage-backed securities as well. While 
less liquid securities were used as collateral for about 45% of large investment bank repos 
in 2005, this rose to about 65% just before the crash.  
 The next largest source of investment bank borrowing is “security credit by 
households,” another form of short-term credit which was about 28% of liabilities in 
                                                 
34 An attractive attribute of repos for lenders is that they can use the collateral given to them by the 
borrowers as collateral for loans of their own, for example as collateral against a derivative position. The 
reuse of collateral is referred to as “rehypothecation.”  
35 Data in this paragraph are taken from T. Adrian, C. Burke and J. McAndrews 2009.  
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2007. These are customer cash-balances held in margin accounts at investment banks that 
rapidly expand in booms and shrink in busts. Though labeled “household” accounts, they 
include securities held by investment banks for hedge funds. Hedge fund data are not 
included directly in the flow of funds; rather, their activity ends up in residual sectors. In 
this case, the residual sector that includes hedge fund securities is “households.” It would 
appear that rapidly rising hedge fund activity was responsible for much of the rapid 
growth in “security credit by households” in the run up to the crisis, a source of growth 
that would obviously evaporate in the event of a crisis.36 
 Since flow of funds data show that total investment bank liabilities doubled 
between 2003 and 2007 and New York Federal Reserve Bank data show that primary 
dealer liabilities tripled between 2000 and 2008, it is obvious that creditors failed to 
restrain reckless investment expansion in the boom.  
 Capital markets did, however, punish investment banks severely in the crisis, 
threatening their solvency. As the boom evolved, reliance on overnight finance increased 
rapidly, while the collateral used in overnight repos became riskier.37 This made 
investment banks increasingly vulnerable to any deterioration in financial markets. “The 
amount of funding that investment banks were doing through overnight repo agreements 
surged between 2004 and 2007; they were rolling over one-quarter of their balance 
sheets every day prior to the crisis, making them vulnerable to a sudden loss of 
confidence” (The Economist, “Rebuilding the banks,” May 14, 2009, p.12, italics added). 
An increasing percent of the collateral used in repo loans were shaky securitized bonds 
issued by the bank-created special investment vehicles to finance, among other things, 
residential mortgage backed securities. When fear that mortgage-related securities such 
as CDOs were worth far less than their face value and that the monoline insurance 
companies that guaranteed payment on the highest tranches of CDOs would never be able 
to pay those they had insured began to spread, lenders refused to roll over their repos.38 
Investment banks lost access to up to 50% of their credit sources, putting both liquidity 
                                                 
36 Information in this paragraph was provided by private correspondence with a flow-of-funds staff 
member.  
37 “Instead of pledging easy-to-trade Treasury securities, banks used highly rated but hard-to-value tranches 
of securitized pools of assets – including subprime mortgages. When investors lost faith in the ratings on 
these securities, their values plunged” (Financial Times, “Move to halt bank 0ver-reliance on short-term 
funds,” September 28, 2009).  
38 See Gorton and Metrick 2009.  
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and solvency at risk. If the government had not intervened to rescue them, the big 
investment banks would have collapsed. Moreover, it was government bailouts that 
allowed the giant investment banks associated with large financial conglomerates, 
including the newly transformed Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, to continue to take 
excessive risk as soon as the worst of the crisis passed, and pay their rainmakers 
excessive bonuses once again. As they rebounded from the crisis, institutional investors 
resumed lending them money because it was now clear they were all under the 
government’s too-big-to-fail umbrella.  
Government Regulators: The radical deregulation process that began in earnest in the 
early 1980s under Ronald Regan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK has been 
well chronicled. See, for example, D’Arista 1994 and Tymoigne 2009.  Investment banks 
in particular ended up with extraordinarily loose regulation. For example, from 1975 to 
2003, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) limited investment bank 
leverage to 12 times capital. However, in 2004, under pressure from Goldman Sachs 
chairman and later Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, the SEC, by unanimous vote, 
raised the acceptable leverage ratio to 40 times capital and made compliance voluntary 
(Wall Street Watch, 2009, p. 17). This allowed large investment banks to generate asset-
to-equity ratios in the mid to upper 30s just before the crisis; Merrill Lynch’s leverage 
ratio shot from 17 in 2004 to 33 in December 2007. The Chairman of the SEC later 
acknowledged that the program “was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because 
investment banks could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily.” Moreover, “nearly one-
third of the firms under supervision had failed to file the required documents” under the 
voluntary system, and the SEC “had not adequately reviewed many of the filings” of the 
firms who did submit documents (New York Times, “S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws 
Fueled Collapse,” September 27, 2008).  
 In the depths of the recent crisis, with massive government funds allocated to save 
the global financial from total collapse, the conventional wisdom was that the 
government would be forced to tightly regulate the system, including radically altering 
bank compensation schemes, to avoid yet another catastrophe in the future. However, the 
Obama administration has shown no inclination to tighten the leash on financial firms or 
to reign in the bizarre bonus system. See Crotty 2009 for more discussion of this issue. It 
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now looks as if the new financial regulatory regime will be too weak to deal with the 
excesses of the rainmaker financial firm.  
Market Competition: The explosion of bonus payments coincided with an explosion in 
the assets, net revenue and profit of large investment banks. Figure 6 shows that the total 
assets of the top five independent investment banks grew from about one trillion to well 
over four trillion dollars from 1997 to 2007, while net revenue (gross revenue minus 
interest payments) rose by 160% from 1997 to 2006. It seems reasonable to ask why this 
period of high growth and of high profit (that would have been much higher if rainmakers 
did not receive such large rents), did not trigger a wave of new entrants to the business. 
New entrants, either from new firms or from smaller firms not currently in competition 
with the giant investment banks that rule the industry, could have lowered the revenues of 
the dominant firms, forcing them to lower rainmaker compensation. New investment 
banks could take advantage of the chronic excess supply of highly qualified university 
graduates who seek entry into the investment banking field but cannot find jobs there. 
These potential rainmakers would have worked for lower compensation than currently 
employed rainmakers receive, giving the new firms a competitive advantage. This could 
not happen overnight because of the apprentice system discussed in the next section, but 
it might have taken place over the intermediate run if there were no strong barriers to 
prevent it.  
 The economies of scale and scope that underlie the oligopoly market power of the 
big firms discussed in section 1b above constitute barriers to entry that insulate the 
dominant firms from competition from new entrants. Investment banks need a large 
capital base, access to massive quantities of borrowed funds at low interest rates and 
established networks of satisfied clients to operate in the biggest and most profitable 
traditional market segments such as M&As, IPOs, and newer segments such as writing 
over-the-counter derivates, creating and warehousing arcane structured products such as 
CDOs, engaging in automated computerized trading, and gambling with the firm’s 
money. The newer segments generated most of the firms’ profits in the recent boom and 
they all require enormous investment in the hardware and human capital associated with 
information technology. To take just one example, consider the high-speed stock trading 
done by super computers. “Although precise figures are elusive, stock exchanges say that 
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a handful of high-frequency traders now account for more than half of all trades and 
collected about $21 billion in profits last year” (New York Times, “Senator Wants 
Restrictions on High-Speed Trading, “July 25, 2009). Only the largest players can 
compete in this and most of the other highly profitable segments of the business. 
 Moreover, as mentioned above, the degree of competition in markets dominated 
by the largest investment and commercial banks has actually diminished as a result of the 
crisis they caused and the bailout that ensued, increasing market control by the surviving 
giants. The crisis thinned out ranks of powerful commercial and investment banks, while 
increased government support for the remaining giants solidified their market power. It is 
now even less likely than it was before the crisis that the forces of market competition 
will force large banks to end their destructive compensation policies. 
 S&P predicts that Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs will now be more 
dominant in investment banking. “While principal risk may decline, they should be able 
to take market share in advice, underwriting, trading and prime brokerage owing to less 
risk-taking by their peers and fewer competitors in the marketplace” (S&P Industry 
Surveys 2009, p. 3).39 JPMorgan has become Wall Street’s biggest derivative player. Its 
contracts were recently 40% of the derivatives held by all banks.40 The credit default 
swap market is now more tightly controlled by the top banks than it was just a few years 
ago.41 A New York Times piece argued that “a new order is emerging on Wall Street after 
the worst crisis since the Great Depression – one in which just a couple of victors are 
starting to tower over the handful of titans that used to dominate the industry.”  It 
continues: “one may be forgiven for thinking little has changed in banking since 2007, 
except a move toward state-sanctioned oligopoly” “Two Giants Emerge from Wall Street 
Ruins,” July 16, 2009). A Financial Times article concludes: “The traumatic upheaval 
that has roiled Wall Street during the past two years has produced – surprisingly quickly 
– a widely acknowledged new pecking order in the world of high finance: Goldman 
Sachs in trading and JPMorgan Chase in banking, have become the undisputed industry 
leaders, with a hand in nearly every deal or trade. Clients can try to avoid these two, but 
                                                 
39 They are clearly wrong about principal risk: Goldman reported surprisingly high profits in the second 
quarter of 2009 based primarily on successful gambling with Goldman money.   
40 Cited in Robert Reich’s blog of July 16, 2009, http://robertreich.blogspot.com/2009/07/goldman-and-
jpmorgan-two-winners-when.html.  
41 See Financial Times, “The ghosts of AIG prosper,” September 24, 2009.  
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only at their own peril” (“A new battle looms on Wall Street.” August 4, 2009). When 
Goldman announced third quarter 2009 profits that were four times larger than in the 
preceding year, the Financial Times noted this “underscored its status as one of the 
winners from a crisis that eliminated two rivals – Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – 
and hobbled others such as Citi, Merrill Lynch and UBS” (“Goldman and Citi highlight 
divide,” October 16, 2009). Consumers also face confront banks with greater market 
power. According to the Washington Post, the four largest banks now issue one of every 
two mortgages and about two-thirds of credit cards.42 The Wall Street Journal reports that 
more than half of US residential mortgages are being made by just three large banks. At 
52%, their share was “just over double these banks’ market share in 2005.” In servicing 
[mortgages], their share is 49%, compared with 22% in 2005 (“Uncle Sam Bets the 
House on Mortgages,” September 18, 2009). The rise in market power affects almost all 
important areas of finance. Five banks now control half of the global credit default swap 
market. “This concentration has increased since the beginning of the financial crisis, as 
several counterparties have exited the market” (Financial Times, “A stronger 
infrastructure will cut CDS vulnerability,” October 20, 2009). 
 The Financial Times capital markets editor Gillian Tett argues that “the system is 
drifting into a pattern where the most dominant lenders are becoming more dominant 
than ever” (Tett 2009). A Financial Times editorial concludes that “the real problem in 
finance is a lack of competition, as the consistently high profit margins of banks suggest,” 
margins fattened in part by an exceptionally low cost of borrowing by financial 
institutions whose debt is guaranteed by the US government (“A mighty financial sector 
is less troubling if banks can be allowed to fail safely,” August 28, 2009).   
 Two important conclusions follow from this discussion. First, rainmakers control 
investment banks and other important financial institutions and run them in their own 
interests and against the interests of the firm and the objective interests of  
its shareholders because nothing – other than government regulation of compensation 
schemes - can prevent them from doing so. This situation would self destruct were it not 
for recurrent government bailouts of financial markets.  
                                                 
42 In Washington Post, “Banks “Too Big to Fail” Have Grown Even Bigger: Behemoths Born of the Bailout 
Reduce Consumer Choice,” August 28, 2009. 
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 Second, since there is a major objective conflict between those who run these 
firms and those who own them, the mainstream hypothesis that financial markets are 
efficient is untenable for this reason alone, as well as all because of all the other 
problems with efficient market theory elaborated in the literature.  
 
IVb. Setting the Rainmaker Share of Revenue: Why Doesn’t the Chronic Potential 
Excess Supply of Rainmakers Eliminate Rents? 
The basic answer is the same as that offered in the previous section. The current 
bonus-based compensation system that gives rainmakers an exceptionally high percent of 
revenue is optimal for them, so they utilize it. No one who could restrain them is willing 
to do so. But rainmakers cannot publicly defend the system on the basis of naked self-
interest. And it is quite likely that many believe they earn their pay. The most widely 
used justification of outsize bonuses by representatives of financial firms is that there is a 
chronic excess demand for rainmakers that leads to intense inter-bank competition for 
their talents. If Merrill Lynch won’t pay a top trader $40 million a year, it is argued, he 
will go to another investment bank or to a hedge or private equity fund who will meet his 
compensation demand. We first critically evaluate the chronic excess demand argument, 
then present an exploratory alternative explanation of why a potential chronic excess 
supply of rainmakers does not eliminate their generous rents.  
 
The rainmakers’ ‘chronic excess demand’ defense of their compensation schemes.  
 One problem with this defense is that, as noted, the highest paid rainmakers are in 
the hedge and private equity fund industries. Thus, any bonus, no matter how large, can 
be justified by claiming that the rainmaker will quit and move to another bank or to a 
fund if he – and it usually is a he – is not paid the bonus he demands. However, this 
cannot be a general defense of high rents because the number of available high-paid 
rainmaker jobs in hedge and private equity funds is miniscule compared with the tens of 
thousands of rainmakers in investment and commercial banks. Only a small percent of 
bank rainmakers could possibly exercise this option. 
Another major problem is that the defense cannot explain the practice of paying 
an outsize proportion of firm net revenues to rainmakers in periods when the industry is 
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shedding jobs. As we have seen, exorbitant bonuses were given to rainmakers from 2007 
through the first half of 2009. Moreover, increasing shares of the bonuses were in the 
form of retention or guaranteed rather than firm or individual performance related, which 
is inconsistent with the justification for the bonus system. Yet we know there was no 
excess demand for rainmakers because the financial sector, including hedge and private 
equity funds, was shedding jobs, not hiring over most of this period. “Analysts estimate 
that as many as 25,000 Wall Street traders lost their jobs in the year ended March 31, or 
about 10% of the financial-services job losses reported by the federal Bureau of Labor 
Statistics” (Wall Street Journal, “Wall Street's B-List Firms Trade on Bigger Rivals' 
Woes,” August 11, 2009).43 “Over all, head counts at the 12 biggest global investment 
banks were cut, on average, by about a fifth in 2008,” so we know there was an excess 
supply of rainmakers, yet the argument that we can’t cut bonuses because other firms will 
steal our staff continued to be offered (New York Times, April 12, 2009, “Crisis Altering 
Wall Street as Big Banks Lose Top Talent”). A Wall Street Journal article summarized 
the problem with this defense nicely. 
There is no amount of shame that will deter the bonus class from pressing their 
demand, no scandal that will put it off limits, no public outrage over AIG or Enron or 
really expensive Merrill Lynch trash cans that will silence the managers' monotonous 
warble: "Attract and retain top talent!" And there is no possible objection to inflated 
compensation you can make that will not be instantly maligned as senseless 
populism… It can't be that hard to "retain top talent" when New York is awash with 
unemployed bankers and traders who are no doubt anxious for a chance to prove their 
own brilliance. (“Let's Move Their Cheese,” May 6, 2009). 
 
 Ever resilient, supporters of current compensation schemes argue that large 
bonuses are justified in bad years, when the industry is shedding rainmakers. First, they 
argue that a new boom will inevitably develop when the crisis is over, and since no one 
knows which future market segments will be most profitable, it is prudent to pay large 
bonuses to retain all rainmakers to make sure the firm is well placed to profit when the 
boom arrives, no matter what its form. This argument anticipates that there will be an 
excess demand for some kinds of rainmakers in the next boom, but since its character is 
                                                 
43 “A perverse outcome of the Wall Street crisis is that compensation as a proportion of revenue could 
actually rise. Pearl Meyer, of Steven Hall & Partners, estimates that Wall Street pay will end up topping 
60% of revenue for the foreseeable future, up from about 50% in past years” (Wall Street Journal, “The 
raise and fall of Wall Street Bankers,” July 2, 2009). 
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uncertain a kind of rainmaker portfolio diversification strategy is prudent. A Financial 
Times piece discussed the argument.  
 Uncertainty over the economic outlook also makes it hard for banks to predict 
which business areas will be active this year, and therefore which staff they need 
to keep happy. … “The major risk to our business is people. For each vacant seat 
there are probably only five people out there who could do it. We’re hoping 
[rival] banks screw up and underpay this year, which would make it easier for us 
to hire,” says the head of commodities at one European investment bank. … [A 
senior executive argues] “It is a very competitive market and we don’t believe we 
can change the system.” This is scant consolation to shareholders in investment 
banks, who are effectively subsidizing the payout. (“Banks’ losses fail to damp 
bonus season goodwill,” January 15, 2008) 
 
The uncertainty defense is illogical as well as self-serving. As a general decision-making 
principle it would lead every firm – financial and nonfinancial - to invest in every 
business and every product that might conceivably be profitable and employ every type 
of worker who might or might not be needed in the future. It is as if no hard choices have 
to be made in conditions of risk or uncertainty. This is not the way to maximize long term 
profits because it leads to expensive chronic overstocking of excess rainmakers 
 Another defense is the argument that in bad years, rainmakers working in market 
segments that were profitable should not be punished by smaller bonuses for the low 
profits or losses generated by those in other divisions. This would be more compelling 
were it not for the fact that in high profit years bonuses rise for everyone in the firm 
regardless of how their division performs. The same people who demand high bonuses 
when the firm losses money because their unit performed well, demand high bonuses 
when the firm makes lots of money regardless of how their unit did. The defense also 
suffers from the problem that in many crises, including the current one, massive losses 
take place in divisions with a small numbers of employees. Paying all the other 
rainmakers high bonuses will reduce profit or magnify loss. In fact, many investment 
bank sub-divisions did well in 2007 and therefore demanded and received large bonuses. 
“However, huge losses from a tiny number of staff – Merrill blew about $20 billion just 
on mortgage-related products – more than offset the profits from other successes. … 
[Banks] are unable to net that off by docking the vast salaries of the few who cause 
havoc. So compensation costs soar as a percent of revenue and investors are left to pick 
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up the pieces” (Financial Times, “On Wall Street: Thorny subject of big bonuses in tough 
times,” January 18, 2008).  
 AIG is a wonderful example of the problem. Its Financial Products division, 
which gambled on credit default swaps, had fewer than 400 employees in a firm with 
120,000 workers. AIG Financial Products was a big contributor to AIG’s rising profits in 
the boom, but in 2008 the unit lost $40.5 billion. Though the US government owns 80% 
of AIG’s shares and invested $180 billion in the corporation, AIG nevertheless paid the 
377 members of the division a total of $220 million in bonuses for 2008, an average of 
over $500,000 per employee. Seven employees received more than $3 million each (Wall 
Street Journal, “AIG Faces Growing Wrath Over Payments,” March 16, 2009). Many of 
these were retention bonuses awarded to prevent key employees in the division that 
destroyed the firm from quitting, a bizarre outcome that generated enormous popular 
revulsion. Events such as these led the Financial Stability Forum to propose as a core 
compensation principle that “compensation systems should link the size of the bonus pool 
to the overall performance of the firm” (2009, p. 3, emphasis added). 
 
While the ‘potential’ excess supply of rainmakers is huge, the ‘effective’ excess supply 
may be too small to substantially reduce rents in the boom. 
As shown by Philippon and Reshef 2009, the rainmaker pay premium has been 
rising since the early 1980s and the demand for financial firm rainmakers has certainly 
risen rapidly over this period, so there would appear to be some empirical foundation for 
the chronic excess demand thesis. However, at the same time generations of students 
from the most prestigious as well as non-elite colleges and universities have tried to 
obtain jobs with a career path leading to rainmaker status in big investment banks. These 
students majored in economics, finance, business, math, physics and engineering, and 
many had MBAs and Ph. Ds. The Katz-Goldin study of Harvard graduates showed that 
the share entering banking and finance rose from less than 4% in the 1960s to 23% in 
recent years. But competition for these jobs in the long-term financial boom from the 
early 1980s through 2007 was fierce. The percentage of Harvard graduates who wanted 
to become investment bankers but were prevented from doing so by the chronic excess 
supply of candidates must have been substantial. Oyer’s study shows the number of 
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Stanford University MBAs who became investment bankers was always far greater than 
the number of jobs on offer. Kaplan and Rauh 2007 estimate there were about 10,000 
rainmakers in large investment banks in 2004, yet over the years of financial sector 
growth there must have been at least hundreds of thousands of qualified students who 
aspired to be investment bank rainmakers but could not obtain an appropriate starting 
position. How can it possibly be that this exploding supply of job candidates with the 
desire and the qualifications to become future rainmakers did not eliminate or at least 
sharply reduce the rents associated with rainmaker positions?  
  The most important answer is that the people who run these firms have no interest 
in lowering rainmaker pay even though a chronic potential excess supply would allow 
them to do because this would lower their own pay. However, above and beyond this, 
there are two barriers to entry that can help preserve rainmaker rents in the face of a large 
potential excess supply of rainmakers. I have not seen these barriers discussed in the 
literature. First, there appears to be an “apprenticeship” process in investment banks. 
Investment banks hire more new employees then they need whenever their business is 
growing. After an initial trial period, those who do not impress their superiors are fired. 
Morrison and Williams 2004 stress the “up-or-out” character of investment banking; 
many are hired who fail to survive this trial period. Goldman Sachs is perhaps the most 
vigorous practitioner of the up-or-out approach. Those who do well are retained by the 
firm and assigned to work with more experienced employees. If their progress is 
sufficiently impressive, they end up apprenticed to firm rainmakers. The ostensible 
purpose of the long apprenticeship is not only to allow newer employees to learn their 
trades, but also to convince current rainmakers that they can be trusted to accept 
important responsibilities the exercise of which can put large amounts of bank capital and 
therefore rainmaker compensation at risk. For example, apprentice traders have to 
demonstrate over a long period that they can be trusted to employ ever larger amounts of 
the firm’s capital without generating large losses. Keep in mind that there is long list of 
rogue traders who ended up severely injuring the firm and its rainmakers. Nick Leeson, a 
derivatives trader for Barings Bank, the United Kingdom’s oldest investment bank, was 
responsible for a loss of over 200 million pounds in 1994. This loss led to the collapse of 
the bank. Aspiring M&A rainmakers have to work their way into a group or team of top 
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firm operatives, then convince the team members that they can eventually generate large 
volumes of M&A fees while keeping the firm’s clients happy.  
 Morrison and Wilhelm 2004 emphasize the importance of tacit knowledge and 
apprentice relations in investment banks during their partnership phase.  
 Tacit human capital… covers forms of knowledge and skills which do not easily 
lend themselves to codification or to arms-length exchange. Such skills include a 
wide range of talents such as advising clients, building relationships, reading 
market signals [a crucial skill for traders] and negotiating M&A deals which are 
essential to investment banking. The skills can only be learnt on the job. While an 
MBA program can furnish a student with technical skills, it cannot teach them 
how to become an investment banker. Tacit human capital is valuable to clients, 
but by its very nature it is hard to measure and virtually impossible to contract 
upon.  This leads to a fundamental learning problem. Only a skilled agent can 
transfer his or her skills to a new hire, typically through a mentoring relationship” 
(p. 2)44  
 
  The conclusion from this line of argument is that the only rainmaker candidates 
firms will consider fully qualified for these important jobs are those already working in 
financial markets at rainmaker or near- rainmaker positions – no matter how many 
hundreds of thousands of potential rainmakers may be available to them. An article 
referenced above quotes an executive who said that “for each vacant seat there are 
probably only five people out there who could do it” (Financial Times, Banks’ losses fail 
to damp bonus season goodwill,” January 15, 2008). When markets are expanding 
rapidly in a boom, there will therefore be substantial competition for these five. Thus, in 
spite of the large chronic notional or potential excess supply of rainmakers, there may 
never be a substantial effective excess supply of rainmakers available to bid away the 
rents in the boom.  
                                                 
44 They also argue that the need for an apprenticeship system ended when the big wholesale investment 
banks went public in the 1980s and 1990s so they could raise vast amounts of capital. The new capital was 
needed to acquire the information processing technology required to support complex financial engineering 
and automated trading schemes, and to finance the huge proprietary trading operations that became their 
leading source of profit in the recent boom. The “increasing emphasis within wholesale investment banks 
upon financial engineering increased the codifiability of relevant human capital…”; the “codification and 
dissemination of what was previously tacit knowledge…” eliminated the need for mentoring (p. 28). This 
caused the costs of market making to fall and made “trading expertise replicable” (P. 28). The trouble with 
this argument is that it is incompatible with the existence of huge compensation premiums for rainmakers. 
Why would an investment bank interested in maximizing profit pay bonuses of $50 million and more to 
traders if anyone with the right training could do the job once it was substantially mechanized or 
‘codified’?  
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 It is important to understand that this apprentice system, though a natural 
institutional component of wholesale investment banking, is not a technologically 
determined process. The peculiar properties of the rainmaker firm influence the way it 
works and turn it into a means to regulate their compensation pools. The firm’s current 
rainmakers will not want to allow more new people through the apprenticeship process if 
that means their own bonuses will be reduced. Current rainmakers have a material 
interest in defending their own ability to generate the revenue that constitutes their claim 
on the firm’s bonus pool. New traders compete with existing traders for access to the 
firm’s limited capital base. A new M&A team may erode the revenues of one with greater 
seniority. Strategic considerations on the part of the existing rainmakers will strongly 
influence the rate at which new members are accepted into and rise within their ranks.45  
 Conditions of rapid growth in the market are obviously most conducive to 
expansion of the rainmaker ranks because the addition of new rainmakers may actually 
improve the bonus prospects of existing rainmakers by protecting the firm’s competitive 
position. Since the apprentice system sharply constrains the supply of new rainmakers 
available to the firm in an expansion, current rainmakers are able to demand higher 
compensation under the believable threat that they will jump ship to a competitor. 
Moreover, the addition of especially talented new rainmakers who will add more to the 
bonus pool than they withdraw from it is likely to be acceptable to existing rainmakers, 
unless they believe the added competition involved will significantly reduce their share of 
the pool. (Competition for bonuses among rainmakers is cut-throat, with threats of 
resignation common to reinforce claims on the pool.) And existing rainmakers may be 
able to exploit new apprentices, then fire them before they attain full rainmaker status.  
 Note that seasoned rainmakers can control the flow of apprentices into the firm. 
To slow it down, they can simply refuse to pass on the tricks of the trade as quickly or 
effectively as possible, and can slow the rate at which the firm’s capital is made available 
to new apprentices. In other words, their bonuses have to be protected in order for the 
apprentice system to function most effectively. A firm whose goal is to maximize 
shareholder returns might seek to build up a larger group of rainmakers working for 
                                                 
45 Senior rainmakers can cull apprentices from their ranks or appropriate apprentice contributions to the 
bonus pool for themselves. 
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smaller bonuses than would  a rainmaker firm whose objective is to maximize bonuses 
per existing rainmaker.  
  The apprentice system would not necessarily constitute an insuperable barrier to 
the reduction of rents in the long run if the top executives of large banks were determined 
to lower bonuses. The formulas used to calculate bonuses for various rainmakers are 
conventional; they could be changed if firms really wanted to change them. For example, 
firms could use the large “reserve army” of unemployed rainmakers created by the crisis 
to ratchet down bonus formulas to lower bonuses at any particular level of net revenues 
or to make bonuses a reasonable percentage of profit rather than net revenue, which 
would protect shareholders in the crisis. This could restrain bonuses and raise profit and 
over succeeding cycles. But we have seen that even when markets crash, firms do not 
take advantage of the substantial excess supply of rainmakers created through job loss to 
cut bonuses aggressively. This is because these are not traditional neoclassical or 
Chandlerian firms seeking, respectively, shareholder value or the reproduction and 
growth of the firm itself. They are run by rainmakers for rainmakers: these firms seek 
maximum rainmaker compensation, not minimum cost.   
 Second, the ‘old boy’ informal hiring policy constitutes a barrier to entry. 
Rainmakers at top financial firms focus their recruiting on a relatively small set of 
prestigious private colleges and universities from which the current rainmakers graduated 
and to which they typically remain loyal. A friend who was a rainmaker for one of the 
country’s largest banks told me that he was the only public university graduate among 
more than three hundred people with managing director status in his division. In spite of 
the occasional token hire from a state school, rainmakers recruit primarily from their 
alma maters, a practice that substantially limits the potential supply of fast-track 
rainmaker candidates. This sharply constrained pool must then be funneled through the 
apprenticeship process described above, further reducing the effective supply of potential 
rainmakers, thereby helping to sustain the size of their rents. 
 
How does the ‘theft’ of joint rainmaker-bank capital affect rainmaker compensation?  
 There is a source of high rainmaker compensation not yet discussed. Oyer 
observes that Stanford MBAs who are employed by investment banks receive “invaluable 
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on-the-job training” and build “task-specific human capital” during their careers. The 
idea that rainmakers accumulate large amounts of task-specific capital introduces the 
question of who gets the benefits from the added productivity associated with this capital. 
A substantial part of the difference could end up with the rainmaker.  Consider the 
concept of the M&A ‘team.’ The team is usually led by a particularly successful M&A 
operative with substantial experience. The leader and the team will have built up an 
extensive network of outside business contacts who trust them enough to do large deals 
with them. Since the winning of trust takes substantial time and cultivation, it is a barrier 
to the entry of new teams. It used to be said that the leader’s greatest asset was his 
‘rolodex’ or list of client phone numbers. An interesting question is: who ‘owns’ the 
‘capital’ or assets represented by this client network - the firm or the team leader?  
 It is not possible to give a general answer, but a substantial part of this capital, 
typically belongs to the team leader and his closest lieutenants. If they leave the firm, 
much of the business represented by the clients in their network may leave with them, 
causing a serious loss in firm revenue, profit and prestige. This gives the leaders 
substantial bargaining power with the firm over compensation. Even though the team was 
created by the firm, required the firm’s capital to finance its business, received an initial 
customer network from its predecessors, and relied heavily on the firm’s reputation to 
expand the network that underpins its bargaining power, the team nevertheless may have 
substantial control over this capital. This power does not necessarily derive from some 
unique talent advantage the team possesses relative to other teams or to potential teams of 
bright young rainmaker aspirants, though the leader is likely to be quite good as his job. 
Rather, it is itself a product of the firm and its apprenticeship system. Thus, a percent of 
the extra compensation gained by the team leader is a kind of ‘theft’ from the firm and its 
shareholders because it is generated by the firm’s capital, prestige and business network, 
yet appropriated by the rainmaker. Oliver Williamson referred to this as the “hold-up” 
problem (The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985). In a 
sense, the very act of creating such a team involves a potential future loss of the firm’s 
existing network of customers.  
 A similar argument might be made for top traders, who learn their profession in 
one firm but can take that experience with them if they leave, and for those who generate 
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innovations in products or strategies. Keep in mind that most innovations in financial 
firm strategies or products cannot be patented. Of course, as argued above, the revenue 
pool that feeds the compensation of the employees discussed here is generated primarily 
from ‘false value’ and oligopoly power.  
 
V. Concluding Observations. 
 The explosion of financial markets in size and complexity over the past quarter 
century and especially since the mid 1990s is one of the most significant economic events 
of this era. Driven by perverse incentives to take excessive risk that resulted in a massive 
buildup of system-wide leverage, by deregulation that removed restraints on excessive 
risk-taking, by an impressive array of financial innovations (many of which turned out to 
be dysfunctional), and by the global integration of national financial markets, the 
economic influence of financial activity and the political influence of financial firms 
reached heights not seen at least since the 1920s. No doubt there were positive 
contributions associated with some dimensions of this long financial boom. However, on 
balance the accelerating expansion of financial markets appears to have been destructive. 
It led to excessive indebtedness among the poor and, especially, the working and middle 
classes of most countries. This raised the rate of economic growth for awhile, but will 
restrict aggregate demand in the intermediate future because these debts have to be repaid 
in a slower growth era. It badly misallocated real resources. Far too much credit was used 
to fund the technology and internet booms of the late 1990s, the mortgage explosion of 
the 2000s, financial speculation and the financial sector itself. The trillions of dollars in 
losses suffered by financial firms is evidence of misallocation.46 Far too much income 
was funneled away from ordinary citizens to financial market rainmakers as well as to top 
executives at large nonfinancial firms who received much of their income as stock 
                                                 
46 Benjamin Friedman has stressed the inefficiency of our current financial system. “The discussion of the 
costs associated with our financial system has mostly focused on the paper value of its recent mistakes and 
what taxpayers have had to put up to supply first aid. The estimated $4,000bn of losses in US mortgage-
related securities are just the surface of the story. Beneath those losses are real economic costs due to 
wasted resources: mortgage mis-pricing led the US to build far too many houses. Similar pricing errors in 
the telecoms bubble a decade ago led to millions of miles of unused fiber-optic cable being laid. The 
misused resources and the output foregone due to the recession are still part of the calculation of how 
(in)efficient our financial system is” (Financial Times, Overmighty finance levels a tithe on growth, August 
26, 2009).  
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options and built up impressive financial portfolios. It was a major contributor to the 
rapid rise of inequality of the period. It drove the global economy into a deep and 
prolonged recession costing many trillions of dollars. This in turn is leading to massive 
increases in public indebtedness that will restrict the ability of governments to operate in 
the public interest for many years to come. It strongly influenced the activities of the IMF 
and World Bank in ways that hurt the developing world. It gave excessive political 
influence to the representatives of giant financial institutions who are now using that 
influence to prevent the creation of an effective new regulatory regime or constraints on 
their pay.  
 Virtually all informed analysts who do not represent the interests of financial 
firms – and even many who do - agree that the perverse incentive schemes under which 
the most important employees of large financial institutions operated were a major 
contributor to the financial crisis. I have presented evidence that rainmaker bonuses were 
shockingly large, even after the markets crashed, and that there is good reason to believe 
they are unearned rents rather than a reward for genuine contributions to long-term 
economic growth. Not even the severe financial crisis nor subsequent massive 
government intervention to rescue these firms (and thus preserve the jobs of most of their 
rainmakers) has affected the practice of paying gigantic bonuses to armies of rainmakers 
no matter how their firms perform. Many have written about the absurdity of rainmaker 
compensation schemes in the business press. But I found only one academic paper 
(Meunier 2007) that even raises the question of how it is that giant firms structured so 
that their top employees enrich themselves while destroying shareholder value and 
inevitably endangering the very existence of their firms are allowed to function without 
meaningful interference by any individual, institution, market force or regulatory 
authority.  
 The paper offers tentative or preliminary answers to key questions about the 
rainmaker financial firm. It argues that the huge revenues generated by rainmaker firms 
in the boom that are the source of their bonuses are created primarily by ‘false value’ – 
incomes generated by transitory boom euphoria and excessive risk-taking, not by long-
term contributions to market value - and secondarily by oligopolistic market power. It 
provides reasoned criticism of self-serving arguments used to defend rainmaker 
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compensation schemes and suggests mechanisms through which the enormous potential 
excess supply of rainmakers is prevented from creating effective downward pressure on 
rainmaker rents. The goal of the paper is to make some initial progress toward answering 
the crucial question of how the sole objective of most of the largest firms in what has 
become the most powerful industry in the country and perhaps the world can be to enrich 
their most influential employees with utter disregard for the disasters this policy entails 
for shareholders, firms and the broader economy. Understanding the rainmaker firm is an 
essential step in the process of turning financial firms and financial markets into 
institutions that will help improve the economic life of the large majority of the 
population.
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Figure 1 
Wall Street bonuses and NYSE firms pre-tax profits
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Figure 2 
Bonuses and Net Earnings for the Big Five Independent Investment Banks  
 
Bear Stearns estimated bonuses and net earnings
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Goldman Sachs estimated bonuses and net earnings
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 Lehman Brothers estimated bonuses and net earnings
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Source:  calculations by author based on data from Compustat. Bonuses are assumed to be 60% of total 
compensation. Data are availible since 1993.
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Merrill Lynch estimated bonuses and net earnings
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Morgan Stanley estimated bonuses and net earnings
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Figure 3  
Top 5 Investment Banks: total cumulative NOMINAL returns, under the assumption of shares 
being bought in the year indicated and held untill 03/25/09
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Source: calculations by author based on Compustat Database. Returns are calculated as a simple average of 
cumulative returns for individual investment banks. Monthly returns are averaged to obtain annual data.
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Top 5 Investment Banks: total cumulative REAL returns, under the assumption of shares 
being bought in the year indicated and held untill 03/25/09
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cumulative returns for individual investment banks. Monthly returns are averaged to obtain annual data.
m
ul
tip
le
s 
of
 v
al
ue
 o
f i
ni
tia
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t
actual value 2.89 3.56 2.26 1.82 1.36 1.26 0.92 0.71 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.47 0.45 0.38 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.37
one 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
 69
Figure 4  
 
Share of total assets held by top 3, 5, and 7 commercial banks (USA, 1992-2009)
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Figure 5  
 
Share of total assets held by top 5 US investment banks in total assets held by the US securities 
industry (2001-2007)
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Industry and Financial Markets Association (for total securities industry assets)
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Figure 6  
Total assets of top 5 investment banks, 1993-2007
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